Up to the present the principal effect of Great Britain's decision to establish a naval base at Sin-gapers has been to direct _attention to naval strategy affecting the Pacific. Tu any consideration of that subject the Dutch East Indies have invariably—entered, and this has been inevitable be-ouse of their huge supplies of One school of thought—and very influential one—states that in the event of the calamity war—between Japan and the United States, Japan would endeavour to seize the islands while the United States would equally attempt to forestall or prevent her, and one reason for Singapore as a base is that Britain would then be in such powerful position that she could act ae watehdow and ensure Dutch ast Indies neutrality. Oby'ously in such an event. as the naval critics have envisaged the continued neutrality of these islands would yo. aw long way towards guarantevine a limitation of th conflict. same view has presented itself te the Dutch Government, so we judge from recent felecrams, and hence their proposals for the construction of a fleet for the defence of their colony. Yet, this prenasal is being opposed teeth and naadl by Socialists and Liberal Democrats, who have already secured a million signatories to a petition against it. We are inclined to marvel great a support to the opposition, for if one country mere than another knows the value of preparedness it ought to Tu the ly days was only because she mobile army in
escaped invasion from the Ger-ably short. time that she man forees. and the moral of the. war years ought to be remembered for a very long time to come. The world has not progressed for beyond its outlook of 194, and yet too soon to trust to the international myfiiey of the Soci clement. That conception of a means to peace got the low it y did in 191 panaces for the Dut h to-day it better chance
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.