While the terror lasted in Warsaw the arteries of communication were guarded with the vigilance a man might bestow on the protection of his jugular vein, if he were told that somebody wanted to cat it. Soldiers with loaded rifles and fixed bayonets stood at the railway bridges, at the telegraph-offices, and along the railway lines. Suspecting that spies were making use of the telephones in order to communicate with one another, the military authorities took over the whole telephone system of the city.
During the height of the crisis, it was impossible to wire or to send a letter, as both the post office and the telegraph officials had fled. But even after both came back. they proved practically useless as media of communication with the outer world. The Post Office held up letters indefinitely. The telegraph ole did the same with tele-private clegrame, for it mean, of course,
goes without saying that telegrams How Germany Makes. War—by General F. von Bernbardi—Hodder & Stoughton—London—2/-
So much has been written and said of Bernbardi's precepts ae regards the duty that a strong nation owes to itself of imposing that strength on others, and so many deplorable examples have been given to the world of how Germany does make war, that there seems nothing new to be said as regards either precept or practice. But the arrival in the Far East of Messrs, Hodder and Stoughtou's admirable cheap translation of this famous book enables one to judge for oneself, with the aid of illustrations from the battlefields of Europe which give poignant interest to the reading. A few of the most technical passages: have been omitted but this, from the standpoint of the average read: er, is certainly no disadvantage.
The philosophy of Prussianism is summed up in the following sentences from the introduction "Our prominent importance as a civilizing nation is plain to everybody since the. German clans have hands to form one powerful Star But we can only carry out successfully these supreme civilizing tasks if our forts are accompanied by, increasing political power as evinced by enlarged colomal pions, international tion in the world that we must rely on our sword, renounce all weakly visions of peace and eye the dangers surroundi jing us with resolute and unflinching courage.
It is useless to reply that those dangers exist only in of Teutonic culture. imagination If other nations evince natural desire to keep what none the less certain that they would never have attacked Germany if she had not attacked them. In German eyes this desire to keep what is their's was the danger to and crime against Germany. Of course, if the nations refused to admit any Germans among them, if the British Empire were closed against Germans as the German Empire has largely been closed against non-Germans, Germany would have some right to complain. But of course this is not so, and the only reason that Bernhardi can give for the teaching he inculcates may be summed up thus: We are hi and strong, you are small and weak therefore it is only our due to take what you have got.
Long quotations are impossible but a few pointe may be noticed. Thus on P. 93 the author congratulates France on having suffered comparatively so little in 1870-71, owing "to the broadminded humanity with which the Germans conducted the But of the future, he adds, is not at all certain that others will manifest an equally high moral standard"—therefore, presumably, Germany decided to forestall them by abandoning moral standards of all kinds, On P, 42 after careful calculation of how to manipulate huge masses of men, the writer concludes that, after all, "not numbers decide but force," a statement which can be interestingly illustrate: ed by many examples in the present war all going to prove that in spite of mechanical perfection in the drilling and marshalling of vast, submissive masses of men, the personal equation counts for as much assever it did. On P. 101 the author emphasizes the urgent necessity of abandoning close formations in face of modern fire—perhaps the one vital part of his teaching which the German infantry hae never been able to persuade itself to accept; and in the chapter Attack and Defence" he has some interesting passages on the moral advantages of lot as compared with This leads, indirectly, to the most remarkable passage in the whole book. Bernhardi is discussing naval warfare, where he is obliged to admit the inferiority of German armaments to those of at least one other Power. How to redress the balance is the great question and hence this amazing doctri Especially atthe beginning of the war and sometimes in peace even—if there is no other way of defending oneself against superior force—it will be advisable to attack the enemy by torpedo submarine boats and to inflict upon him unexpected losses.
The italics above are ours, the whole passage throwing a new light on the exploits of the Koenigin Louise. The saying that "all's fai in love and war" admits of ye wide extensions once war has begin, But seriously to advocate treachery of this kind leaves one simply speechless. Germany can hardly be surprised that she finds a world in arms against her, for while such principles govern Germany, whatever danger she may fancy she has to fear from others, there is no fancy about the dangers they to fear from her.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.