a0 to drive Feng Vu-hsiang out of Honan; the failure of General Tang Song-chi to lessen the importance of Feng's position in Central China; the inability of the Shantung-Chihli combination to make headway in Honan and the prospects of a retreat of Marshal Feng from Honan to Turkestan, leaving Shansi un. protected by Chang Tso-lin and at the same time coveted by Feng Vu-hsiang, were probably} responsible for his decision to fight, Had the Peking group of Tuchuns shown an ability to make a dent in the Nationalist} military organization, it is more than probable that Governor Yen Hsi-shan would have found it to the advantage of Shansi to attack Marshal Feng Vu-hsiang in Honan simultaneously with Chin Yun-ao's uprising, but the decisive failure' at Lungtan justified his pessimism of the probable success of the Northern arms south of the Yangtze -and therefore strengthened his fear of the Christian general. As he could not get rid of the Christian general, he was probably forced to join him, Shansi's plan was to attack! Peking by two routes, the Shihkiachung Route and the Kalgan Route, An army, announced to contain 170,000 braves, wi thrown into the field and fighting] commenced almost simultaneously on the Peking-Hankow and the Peking-Suiyuan Railways. Somehow, Fengtien was caught unaware on the Peking-Suiyuan Railway and suffered defeats} which led to the retreat from Kalgan. It is explained in Nationalist circles that Fengtien's weakness lay in the everlasting quarrel between the older and. the younger elements as to the succession to Marshal Chang] Tso-lin in the Three Eastern Provinces. The younger men favoured General Yang Vu-ting, Marshal Chang's chief-of-staff who is reputed to have Nationalistic leanings; the older men supported Tuchun Wu Chin-sen. Among the younger men_ there was a still further disaffection, as the partisans of the "Young! General," Chang Hsueh-liang preferred him to Yang Vu-ting. While Governor Yen of Shansi was attacking the railways, this internal quarrel was raging within the Fengtien group. The result was, of course, disaster. Now, Fengtien has met that} situation by appointing Tuchun Wu to command of all the Fengtien troops in the Three Eastern Provinces, but their decisiveness is somewhat belated.. Thus, Fengtien suffers in the North, as Nanking had suffered in Northern Kiangsu by intro-party strife at crucial moments.
'The importance of the present fighting cannot be underestimate-_ ed.' If Yen Hsi-shan should be able to take Peking, the Fengtien organization will be forced to retire to Manchuria, where _already the Communists are laying] the scene of their next coup] @etat. Chihli and Shantung will find themselves surrounded. by oppositional groups and. Marshal Sun Chuan-fang: may find his! ito go because in the event of a Fengtien defeat, it is not certain whether Yen Hsi-shan or Feng] }Yu-hsiang will enter Peking and what either of them will do vis-a-vis the Nanking™ Government. On the other hand, a Fengtien victory may result {the elimination of Governor Yen Hsi-shan from Chinese affairs for some time to come, but. it! will certainly mean' that Marshal Feng Vu-hsiaitg will have to tire to the wilds of Mongolia Turkestan to spend a winter feeding his troops on the nourishing soil: of the Gobi desert. To Feng Vu-hsiang, it is now, Peking or bust! © Which it shall be will undoubtedly be settled at the Nankow, Pass in a few days with Yen Hei-shan doing Feng] Vu-hsiang's fighting, which also classically quite in order.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.