The Archive · 1920

Our Paris Letter

The Polish Retreat From Our Own Correspondent

Paris, Aug. 1.

Readers who remember how thoroughly the Bolshevik troops were beaten when they first came into contact with the Poles must have wondered how the position has come to be 0 completely reversed. When the Poles began operations, they moved on a front! of about 300 miles. They captured 50,000 prisoners at very slight cost. to themselves. They appeared to have completely demoralized their adversaries, and yet to-day the Polish army is passing through a crisis very much like that of the Italians aiter Caporetto.

The Polish army, many of whose officers are but imperfectly trained, was undoubtedly inspired at first by a strong sentiment of patriotism, stimulated, by the recovery of national independence. Though very poorly supplied, the Polish soldiers not only endured great hardships but scored victory after victory whenever they came in contact with the Reds. These Successes may have given the Polish generals and politicians ap erroneous idea of the real effectiveness of the army and induced the leaders to ''bite off more than they could cow."" The French officers with the staff saw elements of weakness, and advised the formation of trained reserves, but they were not listened to. When they recommended entrenching, they were told that the Polish soldier was better suited to marching and fighting than to trench warfare, and that the methods which served at the Marne and Verdun were out of place in Russia. Many of the Polish officers brought up on Austrian military traditions, thought the French experts were mistaken and declined to support them.

Amovr-Propre rv. Satvati Aiter the occupation of Kieff, the Poles were trying to hold a front 900 miles long with a very inadequate number of troops. The reserves were too far apart. The Reds made sudden attacks, followed by equally sudden retreats, at various points until they found' out the weakest spot. They finally concentrated on the front held by the 1s: Army, under General Majewski, who had neglected to; protect his lines. When the Reds broke through, as they had no difficulty in doing. reserves had to be brought from the south, whereupon Budienny and his Cossacks became active in that quarter and harassed the Poles terribly, Simultaneously with all this the Bolsheviks carried out a big propaganda campaign among the Polish soldiers. The chief weapon used was intimidation. Fearsome stories of the barbarities practised by the Reds on all who resisted them were circulated. Mutilated prisoners were. sent back into the Polish lines. It"is no wonder that,

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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