It cannot be said that the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition from the Peking Government is an imminent probability. There can be no doubt, however, that it is being discussed more and more every day as a possibility which the Legations may have to contemplate and many, who would be strongly averse to taking such a step in the immediate future, admit that it should come as a logical sequel to the arms embargo and the, Consortium's check upon promiscuous lending on the part of foreign Powers "and promiscuous spending by irresponsible Chinese officials.
The arguments against withdrawal of recognition are based upon grounds which are severely practical and ave in iiapy cases founded upon "'policy,"" used in the good old pre-war sense. The arguments in favour of the withdrawal of recognition are founded largely upon moral considerations, which do not carry the weight in this era of disillusionment that they might, have two years ago.
Unirep Action Harp to Grr, Against the withdrawal of—recognition it is argued that it would be very dificult to persuade all the Powers represented in Peking to agree to united action. Pending such agreement any diplomat who committed himself to depriving the Peking Government of "face" among the nations, would incur the hostility of every Chinese official North China and would be at a serious disadvantage in the everlasting struggle between—the diplomats for Chinese favour and favours. It would therefore be extremely difficult to get any Minister in Peking to do more than hint at such a step until the general sentiment was so strong that he could safely count upon his colleagues for concurrence. It is further argued that if a certain number of the Powers represented actually withdrew—_ recognition, while some one other did not, the Power which continued-to do official business with Peking would stand high in Chinese official favour, would be in a position to exploit the country through the Government without competition, and would reap a rich harvest in contracts and concessions. Again it is argued that if recognition were withdrawn from Peking, political factions in other parts of the country would be encouraged to set out upon campaigns of conquest in the hope of uniting the country under a Government of their own making and that the result would a fresh outbreak of civil war. would be very encouraging to the Parliamentary group in Canton to sea the Peking Government reduced to the level of Canton in the sight of the Powers and inspire leaders like Sun Yat-sen inflict new miseries upon the provinces about Kuangtung in the hope of attracting foreign attention and support to his party.
THe Fortran Investor.
A whole series of objections is advanced by those who are interested in foreign investments in China. They want to know how the Customs revenues, the Salt revenues, the Wine and Tobacco revenues and other securities for foreign loans, such as the railway revenues, would be collected and how they would be disposed of. If the funds were put in the banks and held in trust for the Chinese people pending the evolution of an efficient united government of China, Governments like the American, with a tender solicitude for "China's sovereign rights," would probably make strenuous objection, and, if they did not, Chinese officialdom would devote all its energies to promoting anti-foreign demonstrations and boycotts, arguing that the foreigner was collecting China's taxes and _pocketing the proceeds of the hard labour of the people. It would be easy, say the objectors, to work up a Boxer movement on such a plea. Others say that if the funds were held in trust, the various Tuchuns and other potentates would simply refuse to permit collection of the various revenues and that, if the Pow ished to collect on behalf of foreign creditors, they would have to subdue the officials all and severally by a display of military force.
These are some of the major objections and they are pertinent enough to deserve. detailed consideration and practical enough to demand a practical counter-argument in each case.
Unity tHe First Essewtiat.
It has to be admitted that_withdrawal of recognition by one Power would amount to no more than a moral protest, which might be of some slight encouragement to the Chinese people, and would seriously damage the interests of the nationals of hat particular Power. More harm than good might he done unless all of the major Powers, those with large investments or concessions in China, united to inform the Peking Government that it no longer enjoyed international confidence. To achieve such unity of purpose, no amount of argument by foreigners in diplomatic circles can achieve much. for the simple reason that no single diplomat would have the courage to suggest to his colleagues that recognition be withdrawn, or even to suggest it to his home Government for fear that it would be knowy to Chinese officialdom and would be used against him. Such. action could only come as the result of a persistent demand from the in-would telligent elements among the Chinese people.
Tf expressions of popular opinion were loud enough to persuade the diplomats that it would be better policy in the long run to enjoy the goodwill and confidence of the Chinese people than to win the approbation and friendship of any particular political clique which had constituted itself a Government 10 Peking, it would be a very simple matter to get unanimous approval for a withdrawal of recognition and the representatives of the major Powers would all hasten to take the lead in discrediting a Government organized for exploitation rather than service. Minor difficulties, such as the disposition of Chinese funds, the collection of revenues and other such matters would be lightly disposed of or would be brushed aside for future consideration while the Powers were demonstrating their eagerness to conform to Chinese popular sentiment. Those who feel that we are doing China a serious wrong in continuing to give support to Peking and are inspired to right it, should address their propaganda to the Chinese people and through them to the Diplomatic Body, for while there may be much speculation im diplomatic circles upon the advantages and disadvantages incidental to depriving the Peking regime of international "face," nothing much will come of it until the representatives of the Powers are convinced that organized public opinion can be cultivated with larger tangible returns than the little official monopoly upon governmental prerogatives to which they now find it convenient to consider themselves accredited. The demand for the withdrawal of recognition must come from the Chinese themselves and anyone who has moral or practical arguments to present in favour of such a withdrawal must zo to the Chinese people with them.
A Question or Amour Propre.
An appeal from the Chinese people discrediting Peking and calling upon the Diplomatic Body for help in shedding an incubus, would also satisfy a keen psychological need in the diplomat which no one can appreciate who has not "moved in diplomatic circles," as the phrase goes. The plenipotentiary to some degree, and his assistants in a yeater degree, as they ascend conely to the T'ing Eh-ai, all bask subconsciously in the glory of their own oficial auras. The Envoy Extraordinary to the Beg of Aktagh derives great pleasure from addressing His Highness in official correspondence as "the lord of the Sun and Moon, the Peerless Monarch of all Creation,' because a certain amount of this bogus glory is reflected upon himself. An accredited diplomat, whose accredited is discredited, feels that he has been demoted and suffers a severe loss in self-esteem. An 'nsistent demand on the part of the Chinese people that recognition should be withdrawn from their undemocratic rulers would stimulate an enthusiasm among the diplomats for deny ey and would give them a new pride in being accredited to the Chinese people, in whom all sovereignty reposes according to the Constitution in force in 1913, which would in some degree corapensate
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.