According to those versed in military affairs Chang Tso-lin made] two serious miscalculations in sending his troops straight down the Tientsin-Pukou line. First, he over-estimated the strength and capability of Chao Ti, the Honan Tuchun; and secondly he placed too much confidence in Tsao Jui's ability to keep Tsao Kun neutral) during the struggle. Part of his plan was no doubt that Chao Ti should make a sudden drive against Wu Pei-fu in the direction of; Chengchow so as to prevent Wu from utilizing the Lunghai railway. When that was done, the Anhui troops were to make an advance on Hsuchow simultaneously with a general attack by the Feng-; tien forces in the north.
But Wu, detected the plan before it could be executed. For before Chao Chieh. the Tuchun's brother, had marched many miles westward from Chung-mow hsien, the Chihli troops came \opward and arrested his progress. With surprising speed Wu caused men ready to take the field, to be divided into four fighting units under the command of Chang Tso-hsiang, Chang Buch-liang (Chang Tsolin's son), Wu Chin-sheng and Tang Vu-ling respectively. The Chihli party also claims to have between 60,000 and 70,000 men ready to fight, with 50,000 more coming to reinforce them. These figures are probably all exaggerated, as mobile ization began only four or ave days ago, and neither party has been moving more than 1,000 to 2,000 men each day. But whatever the scale of the fighting, it is not likely last many days, as a few initial victories will probably decide the fate of the warring factions.
Although the mediators are still hard at work, it not believed that they will be successful in their efforts. From an independent source I hear that Wu has sent out a circular telegram denouncing in ivory strong language Chang Tso-, lin's actions amd expressing his determination to punish them. This practically means that he will not {listen to mediation unless Chang is Chao Chieh to retire and Chao Ti virtually to surrender. The Ho- ling to be disarmed. nan Tuchun has now agreed to, dismiss his brother, and, besides, disarming his troops, consented to place all the magazines and munition store:
lin the hands of Wu's; nominees. Thus as far as ie concerned, Chang Tso-lin's plans, have already been defeated.
Phe second point of weakness in Chang Tso-lin's calculations was his belief in the bond fide neutrality of the Tsao brothers, which, he thought, would not only affect the morale of Wu's immediate following but also deprive him of the assistance of tha 23rd Division under General Wang Chen-ping, and influence the attitude of Sun Chuan-pang in the upper Yangtze. Tt was expected that as soon as Sun had begun to adopt a hostile attitude toward Wu, pro-South commanders in Hunan like Sung Hao-keng and Lu Ti-ping would initiate a campaign against Chao Hong-ti, which would facilitate Sun Yat-sen's contemplated expedition against the North. It was also expected, of course, that any of these developments would—secure the Fengtien party the support of such Tuchuns as Tien Chung-yn and Yen Shih-shan, who are willing to side only with the winning party.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.