In the King's Bench Division recently Mr. Justice Acton gave his decision in the case of Brookes v. Brown on the point of whether the Gaming Act of last July can operate to bar actions for the recovery of betting Hebts paid by cheques when the -actions were actually started before the passing of the Act.
Sir Francis Newbolt, the official referee, had decided on the previous day that such actions were not barred, and that the Act was not retrospective, but Dir. Justice Greer had decided at Leeds Assizes that the Act barred all such claims because it repealed the Gaming Act of 1835 (section 2).
Mr. Justice Action, giving judgement, referred: to the decisions of Mr. Justice Greer and Sir Francis Newbolt, and observed that probably there would shortly be an authoritative decision by a higher court as to the correct interpretation of the Act. This claim relatced to money paid arising out of betting transactions, and there was a counterclaim of a similar character. The writ was issued on January 1% last, and claim and counter-claim were based on section 2 of the Gaming Act. 1835. The pleadings were closed on March 22, notice of trial given on the 23rd, and the case came into the list for hearing on July 5, when, through the illness of the plaintiff, there was a postponement, and the parties agreed not to avail themselves of the provisions of legislation ensuing before the case came on for trial. The Act of 1922 re-received the Royal Assent on July 20 last, and the argument for the plaintiff was that that Act did not affect an action where the claim was under section 2 of the Act of 1835 and related to transactions before July 20 last, and in which the writ was issued before that date.
In his (Mr. Justice Acton's) view section 1 of the Act of 1922 had to! be considered as a whole and that section enacted that section 2 of the Act of 1835 which allowed these claims was repealed. This rendered it impossible that any action under section 2 of the Act of 1835 could now be successfully maintained. He therefore followed Mr. Justice Greer's decision and decided that the claim and counterclaim could not be entertained, and he dismissed them. There would be no order as to costs.
Tt was stated that an appeal was pending against Mr. Justice Greer's decision, and, therefore, the judge extended the time for appealing in the present case until the decision of the Court of Appeal was known.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.