Paris, Feb. 15.
M. Andre Tardieu, the ex journalist and special ist in foreign affairs, who was French Commissioner-General in the United States during the latter part of the war and became a member of the Cabinet a few months before M. Clemenceau's retirement, has taken up the cudgels on behalf of his chief, Apparently he thinks that the French political world is not sufficiently grateful to M. Clemenceau and that the full extent of his services is not yet realized by the country at large.
Tu an article in the "lIllustra. tion," M. Tardieu says it is quite a mistake to suppose that M. Clemenceau did not adopt Marshal Foch's theory that the peace conditions must include occupation of the, German territory on the lett bank of the Rhine. From the very first, the French delegation maintained that this occupation was necessary both as a measure of safety and as a guarantee. Without this occupation, Germany would retain the full advantage of her much greater population and again threaten France whenever she chose to do so, and a pledge or guarantee was also indispensable in view of Germany's obvious lack of good faith and disposition to elude her obligations. -According to M. Tardiev, Pre sident, Wilson and Mr. ' Lloyd George recognized the need for a guarantee, but they were opposed to the idea of a military occupation, though they were willing to make the disarmament terms more stringent.
Wuen tHe Car's Away.
On March 11 and 12,. in the absence of President Wilson, cou ferences took place between delegates of the three Governments. The French delegate (M. Tardieu himself) maintained the original point of view, adding that M. Clemenceau had so fully made up his mind on the point that there was no necessity to consult him. As no one would yield, the conference led to nothing.
President Wilson returned on the 14th, and a compromise was then suggested. In exchange for a promise by France not to insist on the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine, England and the United States offered to pledge themselves to give immediate military support to France in case of an unprovoked attack on her by Germany.
M. Clemenceau asked for 48 hours to consider this proposal, and on the 16th he answered it by a refusal, his view being that the occupation of the territory in question was the only possible means of giving France security against 2 sudden attack. His attitude led to something very much like tension, but he held his ground and even-
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.
