The Archive · 1923

The Effect on the Chinese

The moral effect. of such a programme upon the people of China and their governors might not be immediate but it would be sure. China would not evolve an immaculate Government over night, but there would be every normal incentive to reform except that of the exercise of material force which, for reasons too numerous to detail, we have every good reason to avoid.

This programme of course entails drastic and unconventional steps. The Powers which have not only steadfastly refused to withdraw recognition from the various unrepresentative Peking Governments, but have also continued to endorse the collection of revenues for that Government, are likely to be horrified by such suggestions. But this is really the only form which a funding of the national unsecured debt can take if it is to be of advantage to both China and international trade interests, unless the same drastic measures, in support of a banker's league, are taken in some camouflaged form.

It is not likely that the international tariff conference will recommend an international receivership; it is still less likely that the Powers would act in concert upon such a recommendation. But failing such a programme there is no funding scheme which will not do more harm than good, nothing better than the status quo. there is not to be financial intervention, leading to fundamental political and financial reform in China as preliminary or as an accompaniment to a debt consolidation, then all hands, Chinese and foreigners, are better off without a consolidation. We had better wait twenty years or fifty years for China to evolve a Government guaranteeing peace and equal opportunity to traders, than aggravate conditions by meddling clumsily, or by allowing one group of interests to meddle selfishly, for the sake of expediency, to the lasting discom-future of all other interests, com-. mercial or otherwise.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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