Aug. 28.
Shorn of its ornamentation, th apologia ued by General Chiang Kai-shek from Nanking is a document not to be dismissed as the expression of merely bombastic defiance of the Northern faction, Underlying it are sentiments which find an echo in the belief that the Government's forces will not, at present at all events, make any attempt to advance far beyond the Yellow River, Critics who would. protest that the recapture of Tsinan has been grossly exaggerated as a military achievement and that this self-denying attitude is less a gesture than the creature of hard facts, may be right, The news of the difficulties experienced in clearing the three enemy-held cities in the rear of General Chiang Kaishek's advance draws attention issue once more into the military arena and, even if the two Northern Generals parted company, they would be able separately to deprive the established Government of Chiao of any chance of reasserting even shadowy control over the Noith, The main opportunity of the moment is political. If the Northern coalition can stand and the feelers which have, 30 i: is understood, been thrown out for a compromise, strengthened, the Nanking Governmest may be able to arrive at settlement honourable to both sides, This might—indeed would—disturb the peace of mind of Mr. Wang Ching-wei, an implacable enemy of Nanking, but, were come a real possibility, it is unlikely that many would be disconcerted on that account.
Nothing therefore is more conductive to the attainment of peace than the concentration by Nanking of all its energies on the exploration of avenues of comi-promise. Whether Mr. Wang Ching-wei was or was not a communist is purely irrelevant. The relevant point to consider is the intensely strong political resentment which has vitalized the opposition of the North. That resentment arises from the feeling that the Nanking Gos ernment has failed to make itself representative of political to.the danger of prolonging they china and, moreover, has lines of communication into] developed too faithfully the Shantung beyond the point|tendencies of a close corpora-necessary to. preserve " con-ition, Frank recognition of that tact with Tsingtao.
Nevez- charge, coupled with a detertheless the Nanking Gov- mined effort to respond to the ernment are justified in making as. much play as possible with the-success secured against the Shansi troops. Whether this has been followed up by drawing the fangs of the Christian General at Lanfeng cannot be defini ascertained. The highly-coloured rhodomontade of the offer of pecuniary inducements to the soldiers in the pay of the North should not be taken too seriously. Potent as is the money factor in 'a campaign in which the fight soldier on neither side is more than a mercenary and there ig none of that comradeship of the classes distinguishing the armies of the belligerents in the Great War, for example, it is unlikely that General Chiang Kai-shek can convince " the Northern soldier that anything is to be gained by desertion at this particular moment, Probably the keynote of Nanking's policy is to be found in the decision to stand on the Yellow River and to consolidate as far as possible the gains now recorded. This is dictated less by. the military situation, which still has an elusive unreality about it, than by political considerations. The political factor is dominant, At the moment the cohesion of the Reorganization Party (behind General Feng Vu-hsiang) and the Western Hills Party (behind General Yen Hisi-shan) is dependent on the maintenance of the balance of power. It is threatened by the possibility of a weakening of the Shansi faction in the coalition as the result of the fall of Tsinan; it would be seriously endangered by any outstanding success gained by General Feng Vu-Hsiang on the Lung-Hai front; for a development of that kind would, probably, lead to the, alarmed withdrawal of the Western Hills conservatives from the political alliance. General Chiang Kai-shek is therefore 07 sound ground in refusing to take military action which might} solve the growing political difficulties of the North. The break up of the North politically would not necessarily benefit Nanking for it' would merely throw the arbitrament of the criticism which it implies, should do much to clarify the situation. There is, indeed, grave pressure on the Nanking' authorities in this regard. The Communist menace in the Middle Yangtze has not even been scotched. It threatens to increase in its power for ill, in the absence of the assertion of the full strength of the established Government. Continuance of the present chaos unchecked in central China may soon be regarded even. in the most friendly quarters, as a definite and irrevocable abdication of authority, The repercussion of such a considered judgment on the whole situation would be exceedingly disastrous to the aspirations of Nanking. It conceivably would be unpalatable to the better mind of the North. In China crises have followed each other in such close succession and invariably present points of such extreme significance that hesitation must be felt in sin ling one out for special emphasis Let it be said however that, if] the Nanking Government's. attitude hag not been seriously misinterpreted by reading b tween the lines of recent announcements rather than taking at face value the florid rhetoric designed to conceal thought, the present gives a weighty opportunity for coming to friendly grips with Northe: opinion, It is more than an opportunity—it carries a solemn obligation which Nanking seems clearly to perceive and which, by appropriate argument, the North may warmly welcome.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.