These financial problems cannot be worked out effectively without a disbandment of troops. Tt is my!
that there are 3,000,000 men. under arms in China aa. soldiers. or-.-bandits. China, does not ver tire nor eth"she support an: army. of that size. It is roughly: fostimated that approximately "one, milieu dollar' a day has been consumed by these military enterprises this year..A country that is 9 poor in means of communications, fedvcation and industrial develop. ment cannot afford such penditure. If a national army be organized and the remainder of the troops disbanded, only such armies as have proved their fighting value in the present sear on either side need be retained.
For instance, of Feng Vu-hsiang's fores, the Ist Kuominchun and the Kansu Cavalry, have been outstanding; of Chiang Kai-shek's troops, the 4th Army, and so on for cad commander. "If such a method of disbandment were followed, no one man would have much fighting istaneo and ce-ordination effort of all the other forces. But it is doubtful whether " Nanking would be prepared to give up ite huge army of heterogeneous fighters, These troops are not of much value to-day as the war has proved, but with a Europenn staff behind them, such an army may again become important, and that, of course, fon the cards at any time.
It is interesting in this eonnection to note that Feng Vu-hsiang had adhered closely to General Galen's plans for a small, mobile force, deeply impregnated with the Commander's ideology, while Chiang Kai-shek is following the elassicat Chinese organization of pitting great man-power against the enemy in the expectation that numbers will win. The superiority of the small, mobile force in Chinese fighting was clearly proved in t war, both Feng Vu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan having smaller forces than any of other commanders.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.