So little solid fact has there been in the reports of the Naval Conference, so much obvious propaganda and so confusing are the terms of the discussions that have: been going on behind the scenes, that the public may welt have lost interest in the whole' concern, But while we at a distance must remain helpless spectators, it is earnestly to be hoped that the public at Home are alive to the essential facts of the situation, and particularly all those who will be in a position to influence the final outcome. For the telegrams of the past few days show clearly. that: the turning-point of the Conference has been reached, and the immediate future ' appears fraught with serious danger for Great Britain's interests.-Hitherto the only tangible fact we have to go upon is the unheard of sacrifices.she has made. She has announced: that she will be contented with fifty cruisers, twenty: less than what all her naval advisers have hitherto agreed upon as the irreducible minimum, and on no more solid ground, apparently, than. tha firridiscent promises of the Kellogg Pact.. She has cancelled the order for three big and one' smaller cruiser and thus reduced this year's building programme by everton per cent, And while Parliament has never been cousulted on this reduction, it has been: made without any, corresponding offer or suggestion of compensation by any other Power.
The situation has now been crystallized by Colonel Stimson's statement. of February 6, containing' America's present suggestions, as follow:
"The: United. States propose immediate parity with Britain in every class of ship. They suggest a reduction in. the number of battleships, so that the two jects would be equal" in 1931) Instead of in 1942, "The United States, with eighteen larger cruisers armed with eight-inch guns as compared with Britain's fifteen would have superiority of 30,000 tons, but Britain would have a. superiority of 42,000 tons in smaller cruisers armed with six-inch guns.
Great Britain: would, be free to' have eighteen larger cruisers, with corresponding reduction of tonnage in the smaller class; andthe United States would similarly be free to build more small cruisers and fewer large. Colonel Stimson, the telegram continues, "points out that British. battleship fleet contains two more battleships than the! United States. But.the latter! seemingly innocent observation does not "by any means cover the ground. When we look into the facts, it is clear that battleships are the point on which America is concentrating. her attack. The following from Japan, dated February 7, throws: light on the situation:
Regarding the proposal. that, Britain, America and Japan should scrap 5.3 and-1 ships respectively, naval circles point out that although on paper this table' to Japan, the: ips proposed for} scrapping are armed with 12 in, guns whereas the British. ships are armed with 13.5 in. guns and the Japanese ship with 14 in, gun.
A Washington telegram yester-@ay told us. that the United States were considering a. new. suggestion, namely that Gvecl Britain should not get "rid of her battleships in the order of seniority but should begin by scrapping several inthe Queen Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign class instead of vessels: in th Benbow class carrying inferior armament, The message. continues:
-is contended '(at Washington) that satisfactory approximate parity may be gained. by Great: Britain's scrapping heavier! armed vessels, also, in the event that only older vessels are serap-
battleships each, the British.fleet would possess 100 15-inch guns and 16-16-inch guns. while "the United "States -would possess 24 16-inch guns, 124 14-inch guns and 12 12-inch gun:
Where the: parity comes-in, we fail to see, especially as the United States gets a superiority in: 10,000 ton cruisers; which of course become capital ships directly battleships go. It is stated that the new. scheme was drawn up by Colonel Stimson's experts in London and telegraphed by them to Washington, This may or may not be true. But early in the Conference, on January 27, Colonel Stimson. said quite.frankly that what interest ed America was to get the battleship programmes reduced, because, he said, unless this were done, America would be. faced with' an expenditure of G§200, 000,000 during the next six years and of 400,000,000 afterwards. Putting it crudely, this sounds like achieving actual naval superiority for the United States, without her being put to the expense of building ships to attain It is important to note the reactions of other Powers to the American proposals. Reuter tells us that the Japanese. Foreign Office. is reticent but, offciale "are plainly upset at the American proposals." Their reasons. are set out at great length, the gist of them being: that, with battleships _eliminated,.. Hongkong and Manila, both capable of serving 10,000 cruisers, would. become naval cases within str'king distance of Japan. "The whole strategic balance of the Far East would thus be upset"; and- generally speaking Colonel Stimson's suggestions entirely disregard the claims on which Japan has always taken her stand. French opinion is outspoken. "L'Ere Nouvelle" de-claves "that Anglo-American solidarity is becoming so, pronounced thatit might almost] be.called an Anglo-American alliance." Other papers evince equal distrust of what Great Britain and the United States may agree todo, And this brings us to the danger which has now become imminent. As was mentioned in these columns some days ago, there is a fear in naval circles-in London that, if the Conference fails to agree, pressure will be brought to bear upon London from Washington to enter upon a separate scheme of restriction. In this connection we cannot forget the evident susceptibility of the Labour Cabinet to Washington's views and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's natural desire that his own visit to President Hoover should not: prove altogether fruitless. connection with Colonel Stimson's proposals we were told that "he did not feel the present time appropriate to make suggestions to. the French and Ita-lions, whose problems were not '80 directly related to ours." From America's point of view this is true enough, though the apparent forgetfulness of the fact! that the Conference was called to secure naval limitation by all Powers, not by one alone, is odd, But what may.be all right for America is very decidedly not alright for Great Britain, Her naval problems are most direct~ ly related to those of France and Ttaly.and it would be madness for her to enter into an agreement which.ignored the facts of Ler position. regarding ther, more <cspecially. when. it ts fairly plain that such an agreement would give bitter offence to France, to Italy and to Japan.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.