The Archive · 1934

The Naval Game

July 26.

The welter of naval news which appeared in yesterday's issue indi-Jcates the great interest which is being taken in the naval conference due to take place next year, and the manner in which Jcounterproposals are being devised to offset the Japanese claim to parity, instead of the 5-5-3 ratio to strongly objects. The exact nature which the island empire now so

what Washington's reply to Tokyo's demands will be has not yet been divulged, and is unlikely to be until it has been formally [lodged with the Japanese Govern ment, or, perhaps, not until the conference actually meets. 'There is, nevertheless, sufficient material go on to show that, by a series Jof diplomatic checks, an endeavour will be made to secure a modification of Japan's demands, though how far such a process' will be [successful remains to be seen. At the moment there appears to be }not the slightest weakening in the attitude adopted by the Japanese government, and it is difficult to escape the impression that were there to be any modification of the Position already taken up, the Ca-bluet responsible for such a change would speedly be in disfavour not only with the naval and military fielders of the country but with the Japanese public at large. The point was made recently and Jdeserves to be emphasized here that. Japan's failure to obtain parity jin 1922 was the result of the fact that the civilian side of the Gov-Jernment controlled the masses, and was consequently all powerful. That has since been changed, and the naval and military leaders now Jcommand such public support that the civilian elements in the govern-Jment may accurately be said to be more or Jess subservient to them. With the Japanese making a def-

Jand none of the other Asistie problems which were in existence at ithe time of the first conference and those which have arisen since, chall Ibe discussed, the issue has' been narrowed to the greatest possible Jextent, with the likelihood of any Jattempt to widen it leading to the Jcomplete failure of the whole dis-Jcusvion. The question of whether Japan can or cannot afford to Jpermit such discussions really does not enter into the matter, for, when ther she can or cannot, she is Jdctermined that they shall not be included in the agenda of any conference at which she would be invited to attend.

It is suggested that the way Which the United States will meet the Japanese demand for parity is }to insist upon the right to ersate further naval bases in the Pacific, some within easy reach of the JJapanese shores by means of aero plane. It is suggested for example that Dutch Harbour, Alaska, might form one of such bases, and that is jonly some seven hundred miles from the mainland of Asia, and there appear to. be other" spots equally capable of development, Jwhich' when effected would mean the establishment of far-flung defensive outposts, necessitated in view of the Japanese desires to secure the greatest possible degree Jot naval development. The defensive nature of such an arrangement—offensive though it undoubtedly Jappears to be at first glance—must emphasized in view of the fact that whereas under the 5-5-3 ratio Japan was accorded a sufficient strength for all defensive purposes, the increase in Japanese naval }powers, such as is being demanded, {in fact transforms a defensive orlyanization into one capable of speedy and effective offense. With Japan situated as she is at present, Jand the difficulty of any naval force being able to reach her in sufficient strength to stand any reasonable Jchance of annihilating her fleet, it not at all easy to perceive why she should require more than she Jalready has, unless it is for the [purpose of at some time or other expanding her naval activities beyond what was originally contemplated.. Consequently, if: t is believed—and there is ample Jground for so doing—that the expansion of the Japanese navy beyond its present limits is in its nature inherently offensive, then the best defensive measure that can be Jdevised, having regard to all factors, is the construction of bases within easy aerial reach of Japan.

The American suggestions, ne-Jbulous as they are at the present moment—indeed they may only be forecasts of the attitude which the [United States may ultimately adopt—seem to be founded on an apprejclation of the very real dread in Japan of the existence of places near to itself whence aeroplanes in force might be sent to destroy the very nerve centres of the nation's defence. Such an one is undoubtedly Vladivostok, or in-Jdeed any suitable spot in the Maritime Provinces. Vladivostok as Jan air base is a spearhead presented at the very vitals of Japan. The multiplication of such threats the creation of other such bases the United States, or indeed, any Jother Power in a position to do 50, constitutes a threat which may not entirely be removed by the possession of a larger number of major Jwar vessels. To that extent the /Stggested American proposal has an undoubted significance. It does in-[deed constitute a powerful reply to [the Japanese demand for parity and brings America within closer striking distance, even if only for the Jdefensive purposes with which Washington is to be unhesitatingly jeredited. There then rises the Jcomforting reflection that the Pow-Jers are not entirely devoid of bargaining points when it comes to the final conference, not without some Jeffective remedy should the discussions be brought to the end which it is anticipated they will be Jbrought unless Japanese demands Jare accepted in toto. As has already been pointed out the suggestions referred to have not yet assumed ithe character of official proposals, [but they do indicate possibilities of which Japan may very well be expected to take keenest notice. [Whether they will have any effect upon Japanese naval policy remains to be seen, though it is apparent that Japan's insistence on the aboli-ition of the present ratio, even if by unilateral action, does not present Jail the serious prospects which it nite stand that only naval matters, was at first anticipated it would.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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