The Tuan Chi-jui lieutenants in Tientsin unite in denying that they have any interest in playing Chang Tso-lin against the Chihli party. They say that the traditional Chinese idea: in polities is to "use poison to kill poison" and that the result of this policy, in nine cases out of ten, has been to substitute a more deadly poison for a comparatively harm-ay less one. They are not unaware the fact that to bring' Chang T'so-lin into Chihli at the moment ct a Chihli collapse would be to substitute a worse for a bad dictatorship. believed in Tientsin that if Wang Yung-chuan is really "playing both ends against the middle" in fukien, Chang Chih-will probably get the advantage in any encounters which he has with the navy and will hold his own. As an officer 10 the 4th Division he has had many opportunities for learning what a land battery can do to a Chinese gunboat, whith is invariably weak on gunnery and nearly always short of ammuni-tien. Chang Chih-pin participate in 1911 in the fire upon Admiral Sah's ficer with a couple of mountain guns, which, after peppering nearly ati the boats generously, forced them to withdraw from Hankow to Kiukiang. A few years later this same 4tl Division with light artillery made things lively for the fleet in the Huangpu. It is probable therefore, that he and his colleagues are not likely to be' terrified by gunboat fire.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.