Jan, 8.
On or about January 15 it is expected that Mr. Pu Yi, the Regent and Chief Executive of the Manchoukuo administration, will once more be an Emperor. As Husan Tung he reigned in Peking from 1908 to 1912. For two short weeks in July, 1917, he was restored to. the Imperial state, In March, 1932, he became Regent of the newly-created State of Manchouluo, recognised only, by the Japanese Empire whence his authority was mainly derived. Mr. Pu Yi, or the former Emperor Hsuan Tung, has no reason to be diffident in accepting the further honours offer: to him by the Japanese. It is generally admitted that, after his abdication, he was by no means well-treated by the new regime in China. He can hardly be reproached for accepting the position which the turn of events in Manchuria threw open to him, So far as can be judged, he and his consort have filled their allotted roles in Changchun with dignity and discretion, They have made no extravagant claims and ifthe State of Manchoukuo required a Manchu figurehead, the Japanese organisers of the new administration could have made no better choice for the Chief Executive than the person of the amiable young man whom Fate had ill-treated and yet spared, when the Imperial throne of China was brought to the dust, Whatever views may be held by Chinese in Manchuria regarding the course of events since September, 1931, they may perhaps derive some solace for national pride in the nominal chieftainship now installed at Changchun, Whether he now be called up to assume the Imperial style may be a matter of indifference to. them. It is not likely to meet with their resontment. That it will enable the Japanese to proceed definitely with the larger designs for the Inclusion of Mongolia with Manchuria in a buffer state will arouse no special surprise.
That probably is the key to the situation, An interesting summing up of the feeling in the North on the suggested revival of the Emperor's dignity, albeit with the power left in other hands, was given yesterday in a message from this journal's Peking correspondent. Sir Reginald Johnston's views, as cabled by Havas a few days'ago, must perhaps not be ass the basis of that nec brief precis. At the same from—other "expressions of El opinion which Sir Reginald has made public from time to time; it is reasonable to suggest that he labours under. the delusion that there is considerable enthusiasm for the restoration of the Empire among the Chinese in the North. This delusion is forcefully exposed for what it "by the message from Peking: Sir Reginald would probably not be thrilled by the list of champions assigned to the Imperi cause: the 130,000 troops formerly under Marshal Chang Hsueh-Vang and the Manchu and Mongol population of the North: For the purposes of the argument which Sir Reginald and his friends seck to establish, it Would be necessary to find that the restoration of the Empire appealed to the imagination of the masses and commanded the support of an appreciable section of the educated and commercial classes. That condition, according to the message from Peking, is not fulfilled. In other words, the most that can be said for the restoration of the Empire in Peking is that it would bring a negative sort of Balm to the North's acute dissatisfaction ith the Government at Nanking. Any attempt therefore to discuss the Japanese plan for elevating the former Emperor in Changchun, in terms monarchical revival in Chins must be regarded as the product of a fundamental misapprehension of the situation. It is exceedingly doubtful, to say the least of it, whether the Japanese have any such thought in their minds. "Nor will it be inferred that the Imperial state with which they propose to invest Mr. Pu Yi is anything more than the pale simulacrum of that which formerly was enshrined in the Forbidden City.
Discussion of the proposed change in the status of the Regent of Manchoukuo cannot profitably range round the issues with which the Lytton Commission and, ultimately, the League Nations have dealt. It is an id pastime to argue that the restoration of the Emperor at Changchun has any significance for"Chinese in China proper. There is n not altogether ill founded conviction that Japan's recent coldness on the recognition of Manchoukuo is in some degree due to the march of events. Annexation of Manchoukuo, with the necessary suzerainty over Mongolia, where, as the official Japanese toments would say, Japan has pecial interests," may effective ly dispose of difficulties hitherto presented iby the Leagu findings. Mongolia is geographic cally and politically a vague term. It is no less blessed than Mesopotamia once was. The independent Mongolian princes jate adepts in the art of playing off one of their powerful neigh-hours against the other. For their dealings with Russia they would not be at all disinclined to be able to rely on the support of Japan. In the present state jof China, where the Government has had to allow the doctrine of regional autonomy to" obtain generous interpretation, the Mongolian princes would' prefer relations with—Manchoukuo. Their own conservative notions of personal rule would be mor in consonance with the atmos-Dhere at Changchun, where they would also find a further and, by no means the least, important jadveatage of strength derived from the ultimate authority in Tokyo. On this note it may be surmised that the direction of Japanese policy has been con-penetrated. Ever since the first move in September, 1931, the General Staff has plainly kept in mind the goal of the buffer Mongolian State stretching from the Gulf of Pechihli northwards to the Great Khingan Mountains, And, however the problem has been discussed on Tokyo's behalf in Geneva, or elsewhere, the dispositions of the Japanese War Office have never relaxed grip of the main political objective, which is designed to create a sure shield for Japan's economic curity in the day of that ultimate clash with Russia. If, in the process, the fabric of hina should become even more sorely riddled and torn, that would be regarded as purely China's affair. So the separatism of Canton, the defiance of Fukien, the' internal dissensions at Nanking, the turbulence of Szechuen and the sovietisation of Kiangsi, would leave Tokyo cold. So long as Peking was well within hail of the Manchoukuo wardens of Jehol and Charhar, the plan would proceed. On January 15, or on whatever date Tokyo sees fit to name, it may reach another definite stage of accomplishment,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.