{to the fore as an insistent suppliant for more of Mr. Takahashi's financial favour, To make military thay while the sun shines is the obvious solution for the Kwantung, JArmy chiefs: whether it accords th the requirements of the For-Office, now endeavouring to Jobtain a smooth passage for the Jehange in Ambassadors, is as immaterial as the consideration of Chinese feelings. In the present. lconfict of administrations North it is easy to mi thesis that the strong arm is once more required {0 assure peace and Jcontentment to the sorely-tried And strong arms s bear the marks of Japanese proval or are ak case sesigued tot [disreputable category in which its, communists and other ere creatures painfully edly exist.
Past experience suggests that it would be superfluous" to inquire whether the Kwantung Army: ha secured Tokyo's approval of its plans. Yet interrogation on this apparent putage might be usefully directed: jon other lines, Granted that the yese General Staff perceive the vantage of creating a companion. to their four-year old Manchoukuo, for the better prosecution of the is not be too dearly bought.
Jeconcmie development of the North for the strengthening of Japan's, resources can be effectively Jcouraged by political activities Jon foot in diplomatic form, ile of Manchoukto does not immediately endorse the ability of purely military regime to make such adventure profitable. be accepted that the Army Navy have the last word in finanei at Tokyo, it is dificult to} believe thi aps and means can be definitely Hoes not necess with infallible prevision, ax Mar-shat Badogtio ix finding out just now. In being gradually 1 ucceplance of ever: commitments in China, thy widening the operative influence of the unknown fsetor. 'Thus they are immeasurably increasing Bab! which, in the last resort, have to be Jexpressed in figures on hoshi's Budget. Putting it mildly' th not achieving this penetra tion with the exercise. of special, tenderness for Chinese sentiment. They have been assured of the imresistance to the dismemberment the North, but when re to the accumulation of reset which seems likely to be xeric led by their actions, it is not reasonable to ask whether the risk ing a feeling of verite ion in Chinese breasts dues the power of present assexs= ment, This journal must nut be: taken to beliftte the capacity of th jung Army chiefs or their iduity in making careful How Junce for all eventualities. It ventures merely to point out that there are} which answers fie ven without raising Issues of me importance and complex-it deters peel of]
ly because such might be considered supererogatory in the circumstances Tt is more spprop rd the interrogatory whether by. in-
Jgenious manipulation of the strate map-maker's instruments national destinies—and nation effectively 4 permanent expression.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.