Oct. 27.
Whether the sixth meeting tween Mr. Shigeru Kawagoe and General Chang Chun will give definite impetus to the search Cor solution of Sino-Japanese relationships must be left for the event to determine. Two reported state~ ments from Japan have a cheerful significance. General Count Hisaichi Terauchi is confident that the diplomats can handle the problem satisfactorily. Mr. ¥. Suma, whose reticence on leaving Shanghai for his brief visit to Tokyo received special comment from the Japanese press, has committed himself to a well-merited rebuke of the tone of certain Japanese telegrams: and despatches as calculated to increase the difeully of arri at_an amicable settlerness Suma's judgment on that point deserves respect. It also suggests that he appreciates the importance of keeping a strict guard on partisan expositions of a delicate situation. In the light of the present hesitations in Tokyo it may be reasonable to sympathize with Japanese Government in the com= mitments with which it may have been gratuitously presented by the volatility of the past comment so rightly condemned by Mr. Suma. Realizing that two nations can seldom solve their differences without appropriate use of the virtues of compromise, the Foreign OMice will feel that that method of diplomatic treatment may evoke disappointment in Japan among, eager adherents to the doctrine of positive action. So often the critte writing for Japanese consumption makes use of the cliche "China China," that the discovery of some Points on which China is inclined display susceptibilities common. to other nations may come asa rude shock. General Terauchi': confidence in the Foreign Ofice may be comforting, but it will have been noted that the argument in favour of a rupture of negotiations is not solely sponsored by the Japanese Army in China. Mr. Hachiro Arita himself has" ventured to give modified endorsement of that view by declaring such a breakdown to be preferable to a Tt may be useful to consider the requirements which seem to govern Japanese policy. The pressure in the North is firmly directed toward developing economic ce-operation. With that desire the Chinese Government may be said to be yen-erally in accord. Not so certainly' does Chinese opinion favour the obvious tendency of the Japanese military to persevere in creating out of Suiyuan and Charhar an Inner Mongolian buffer state to preserve the left flank of Saponified Manchoukuo (including—Jehol) against the possible development of Sotiet "aggression in Outer: Mongolia and on the other side of the Manchoukuoan border. This aim implies a determination 10 obtain political contro! of Hopel, if not of Shantung. For the moment that aspect of Japanese ambitions. is crystallized in the endeavour make sure that General Sung Cheh-yuan is amenable to Japanese advisers who have been specially selected to meet the requirements of the situation. So far General Sung Cheh-yuan has managed to preserve his.equilibrim but it is an open secret that the process involves irritations which find expression in the doubts openly entertained by Japanese observers who are, therefore, disposed to urge a stronger policy: beyond the probable inclinations of Tokyo, where, taking into acvaunt recent developments Japan and certain evidence of Chinese obduracy, the counsel of caution is for the moment favoured. However, complacent may be the attitude of Japanese military opinion on the spot when the prospect of non-diplomatic pressure is mooted, it does not, find so confdent an echo at headquarters. Tokyo realises that it is not always the first step which is troublesome. It is easy enough to launch a military campaign; it is not so easy to predict or control Its extent. or ultimate limitation, as Japan herself found after September 1931, Meanwhile signs of growing impatience in Japan are discernible, Attributable though they may ye to the steady cultivation of grandiose expectations, fortified by ton ready acceptance of facile depreciation of Chinese unity, they are now allied to an imperfect grasp of the reason for what are regarded as unwarrantable delays on the Chinese side. Moreover the occurrence of recent murders of Japanese residents in China interpretation have been given in plain enforcement of a dangerous set of theories which are taken to Justify claims likely to embarrass diplomatic methods of approach, By this time it would seem that Japanese opinion is oblivious to the existence of differences which bring sharply into question the definition of equality. The Chinese Government may feel that the test of equality lies in the ability of Chinese troops to move in North China at the will of their national 1g Government, For many months past that condition has been dis regarded, while Japanese troops on foreign soil have been subject to no inhibition except that sanctioned by their own authorities, With the marked advance in the solidarity of Chinese national thought—a direct product of recent Japanese policy—the case for redress, of this inequality has been strengthened in Chinese minds, although It seems to be impossibly fantastic Japanese critics who have been so Sedulously underlining and expand~ ing the notion of special Japanese interests in North China—and even. further afield. China suffers from a long period of physical helplessness. Japan suffers from a sustained and progressive assertion of Japanese dominance in Chinese affairs. It is greatly to be hoped that the ability to review the situ tion in the clear light of realities may assist. Japan in restoring a diplomatic equilibrium from which a workmanlike settlement on the basis of compromise may be devised in Nanking. Otherwise th apprehensions of a breakdown may find unhappy justification. If the breakdown occurs, there is 10 reason to expect an immediate crisis. The relationships between the {wo countries may revert to that state.of suspended animation in which, however, ultimate danger may We Japanese plans in the North in so far as they keep to the economic ce-operation so long prescribed and already initiated, may gradually achieve results, but the elements of risk will be intensifled. At any moment the pressure may—either by deliberate action or unwitting adaptation to the apparent needs of Japan—precipitate clash which, once invited, may bbe pregnant of consequences beyond the control of either side. This lull, which has undoubtedly relieved the extreme tension of a few weeks ago, will then have: ex-Ihausted itself, and the relations between the two countries will have reached a precarious uncertainty, to be resolved only by an incalcularly serious measurement of strengths.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.