Apri 13, The burden of the Chinese Gov. ernment's protest to the Soviet Government appears to take the me that conclusion of an agreement with Outer Mongolia, Chinese sovereignty over which was specify cally recognized in the Sino-Soviet Agreement of May 31, 1924, is a lear breach of that recognition. The Soviet Government replies that there is a precedent in the agree mont signed at Mukden with the late Marshal Chang Tso-lin as head of the Three Eastern Provinces in September 1924. The Mukden agreement dealt mainly with the then Chinese Eastern Railway and reproduced several articles from the main. Sino-Soviet Agreement relative thereto. It would appear therefore that reference to that document is merely designed. to eile a precedent for diect negotintion between Soviet Russia and an administration nominally under Chinese control, Whatever may be the rights or wrongs of this con~ tention it does not seem to be a happy reminder. On the day that! the Mukden agreement was signed hostilities broke out between 'Marshal Chang Tso-lin and General' Wu Pei-fu who at that time was at the head of the Chinese Government, Moreover the Foreign Office at Peking lodged an emphatic protest, although the almost immediate collapse of the Wu Pei-tu regime threw the incident into obscurity. It will be noted that the present protest from Nanking considers that the Mukden "Agreement was "rectified" by being treated subsequently as an annexure to the Sino-Soviet Agreement. Article V that main agreement runs thus:
The Government of the USSR. recognizes that Outer Mongolia. is an integral part of the Republic China and "respects "China's sover clpnly therein. The Government of the og the 0 the troops of the USSR. from Outer Mongolia—namely, to the time-limit of the withdrawal ff such troops and the measures to be adopted in the interests of the toty of the frontiers—are agreed upon at the Conference as provided in Article I of the present agree-mont, it will effect the complete withdrawal of all the troops of the USSR. from Outen Mongolia. in point of fact the Conference did not complete its Jabours. In 1027 relations between the two countries were interrupted to be resumed in 1932, when the situation, especially "as regards the Chinese Eastern Railway had radically changed, Outer Mongolia, as Mr. Owen Lattimore points out in the China Year Book, has asserted the principle that the fall of the Manchu Empire broke the political connection between it and China:
Supported by Russia, Outer Mongolia achieved @ form of autonomy which acknowledged the inlorests of Russia to self-government of the Mongols.
It should, however, be pointed out that the Mongol princes originally atempled to strengthen their in~ dependence by maintaining nominal] allegiance to China. Economic conditions tending to make Outer Mongolia specially dependent on Russian rather than Chinese rela tions have affected this attitude.
Since 1924, when the constitution for the "People's Republic" of] Outer Mongolia was proclaimed, that country has been virtually affiliated fo Russia although not formally made part of the USSR. The position 1s complicated since for purposes of international negotiation Outer Mongolia is not} member of the U.S.S.R. nor does the" USSR. claim sovereignty. 'Any nation wishing to negotiate with Outer Mongolia would therefore have 10 approach the Urga government itself, or else the Government of China, which claims sovereignty. As," however, the] 'Urga government' repudiates Chinese authority and no government except that of the USSR. has! recognized Urga (renamed "Olan Bator Khoto, City of the Red Hero), the only foreign relations of Outer Mongolia are, in practice, with] Moscow.
In the creation of the independent Ouler Mongolia trading relations with China were abruptly stepped, the break being underlined by a "cancellation" of debts to China. Russia has consequently had ready access to the Mongolian market for wool, hides, livestock and furs. In return the Mongolians are reeclving technical assistance from Russia and are being encouraged develop their own resources with every appearance of success.
This of course does not minimize the significance of the Article of the Sino-Soviet Agreement which recognized Chinese sovereignty. Yet it is improbable that Moscow and Nanking will be inclined to allow their own direct relations to be disturbed by too rigid an insistence on the academic issues Involved. It is easily argued that) the mew pact merely recognizes what has been the actual practice for several years. From the Russian point of view close understand~ ing with Ouler Mongolia is necessary in the light of frontier perplexities elsewhere. How far the policy of Moscow is intended to check the possibility of a fusion of Mongols in Outer and Inner Mongolia for the formation of a new Mongol state cannot be judged. Inner Mongolia—suffering intensely at the moment from the terrible effects of a devastating winter—is. credited with an autonomy movement but it still remains under Chinese suzerainty in circumstances of considerable difficulty. Moscow's assertion that the new pact does not make any change in the relative positions of Outer Monoglia and Soviet Russia as they have stood for the last twelve years, is understandable, but many observers will sce {in It yet another sign of the grow-Ing intensity of the struggle for power on the Northern frontiers of China, From Tokyo, as was to be expected, demure disapproval is voleed. Therein may be discerned ground for the belief that no special development is likely to acerite from the apparent divergence of views in Nanking and Moscow on the merits of the agreement. It is a far cry to" Urga, even when it be called the City of the Red Hero.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.