The Japanese position is different, The local problem of disposing of provincial Chinese troops cannot be id to be ihe primary objective. To arrive at that, it is necessary to indulge in, retrospection, In 1931 out of a local incident at Mukden, Japan put forth her military strength to control the three North-Eastern provinces. Her pláns seemed to develop methodically; actually she was drawn further and further to the other side of the. then Chinese Eastern Railway by the relentless logic of events, For example, in November 1931, she yas afürming that she would never s that railway or even have anything to do with the former Emperor of China. By the end of November she was attacking Tsitsihar. By the following April, the former Emperor had been installed as Chief Executive of Manchoukuo.
r became the Emperor Kang Teh. larly there was no deliberate intention to take Jehol, judging om official declarations, but in the ter of 1932-93, Jehol was duly absorbed into Manchoukuo and a definite part of Hopei attached to it for ihe purpose, to say nothing of a strip of the Mukden Peiping line as far Shanhaikwan. Penetration into thar naturally proceeded, It received a special stimulus from events in Hopei in the summer of 1935 when the last of the former Manchurian armies was evicted, the Ho-Umetsu agreement created the Hor Charhar Political Councit which found itself flanked on the eas. Jy ibe East Hopei autonomous regime developed from, the demilitarized zone under the said agreement, In Suiyuan a Mongolian revolt assisted by Manchoukuo troops was unsuccess-fe! in the winter of 1996-37. Earlier however, in September 1936, the Japanese had secured another foot-old in Hopei by taking the opportunity of a local incident to occupy Fengtai and so complete their domination of the Peiping-Mukden and Peiping-Suiyuan railway lines.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.