Government Safe in the Lower House but Upper House Dissatisfied with Naval Poli From Our Own Tokyo, Apr, 10, With the extraordinary session of the Diet only a few days away, the political dovecotes of Japan have begun to Mutter busily, This special session, which will be convend on April 21 and will last for three weeks, will deal with many big issues, the principal of these being the policies of the Government. towards naval disarmament, the lifting of the gold embargo, unemployment and the acute trade depression and at least one big public scandal in which Mr, I. Kobashi, former 'Minister of Education is' charged with having taken bribes while in office, The. Government possesses an absolute majority in the Lower House and hi lo fear of being able to steer its way through in this Chamber; but. the indications 0 to show, that thes Upper House is dissatisfied with thp Government policies in regard to naval disarm: ment and its failure to do anything towards minimising the effects of the business depression and the unemployment. situation, and hot, de-hates are expected there, The Ministry has already taken steps to "bring about an understanding with the Peers and has, for this purpose, Aoputed some of its members to ex: plain the Government's position and to ask for the ce-operation of the Upper House, If,, however, the Peers are adamant and intends to oppose the Government resolutely then the Cabinet, according to Minseito (Government party) organs, are fully prepared to give Dattle to the Upper House, The Hamaguchi Ministry is. Hiably expected to defend to the Uimit all the decisions made at the London naval conference, and will take the stand that the conference has resulted in a brilliant. success for Japan when viewed from the standpoint of international cooperation, better understanding and the tentative reduction of naval ex-lenses; while the Government will ist _as strongly as possible that moment agreements reach-ndon have not, in any way, reduced the country's defences to a int incompatible with national weurity; but, on t by strengthening Japan's international status, have contributed enormously towards security than would have doen the result of securing a few more submarines or an extra Thi miser or two, The question of how to expend the money that will be saved through the London naval confer ence will also loom big in the Diet discussions. There is already a crat scramble for the funds thus ed, The Navy is expected to demand the lion's share in order to make good the alleged defects in the national defence scheme. maintains that, as the result of the weakening of "the scheme for sea defence laid down by the Supreme Defence Council in 1923, it should be given the first opportunity of making good the defects, Navy's argument boils do—no matter what conce made to Japan or by Japan in other categories, this country must have seventy per cent. of the American strength of 10,000-ton er mounting eight-inch guns. This, under the circumstances, would bring Japan's big cruiser strength almost to par with that of the big cruiser strength of the British Navy, the very thought of which would make Australia and New Zealand panicky. The solution thus far reached is for the United States to postpone construction of a number of these big cruisers—most of America's big emi are only Blue-paper prints—unti] near the end of the five-year period to be covered by the proposed treaty, Japan at the same time making a unilateral declaration that she is free, when the next disarmament conference meets, to re-open this question, The Navy Department is far from satisfied and demands that the air must be expanded until Japan has 1,000 bombing planes and fighting sea-planes, that const fortifications must be greatly improved and that naval bases must be brought into a more up-to-date shape. The Ammy is also complaining that the weakening of the Navy means a corresponding weakening of the sister service and is also planning anfbitious aeroplane expansion share of
ed, go towards the fighting threes, is l, it is concede and some publicists are very doubt ful whether the public will have any real. benefit of the economies effected through the London conference. Proletarian members of the Diet are urging that all the money saved should be devoted to rating unemployment and in work, contending that the agreement tentatively reached at London is really a political guarantee so that, consequently, further expansion of the fighting arnis is not called for, and declaring that the real peril to Japan i the present insecure economic con dition of the country with unemployment and distress growing by leaps and bounds. Business interests in the Lower House maintain that the " ject of saving money is to promote the country's economic welfare and that, therefore, the bulk of the saving effected should be devoted to help trade and commerce and to rescind taxes and that handicap business, lo it is thought that the Government will be able to weather any storms that may occur in either House. of the Diet, the question the attitude of the Privy Council constitutes a serious stumbling block When a three-power treaty, or a five-power treaty—as the case may be—is laid before it, It is the duty of the Privy Council to examine all treaties and, if satisfied, to recommend them for ratification to His Majesty the Emperor. The papers Feport that the concessions made by Japan at London are very offensive to the Privy Council and that, unless the Government is able to'convince these elder statesmen that the agreement reached is fully com patible with safeguarding the national interests, they may not take the responsibility of recommending ratification of the treaty to the Thorne. Here, again, the whole centres around the question of Japan having seventy per cent. of the big-cruiser strength of the United States as a recognized, hard-and-fast principle. However, not believed that the Privy Council go the length of advising nontification because of domestic disagreement with regard to. the ultimate value of the agreement.
is would precipitate a very undesirable international issue and would constitute a very bad precedent, for Japan has not yet refused to ratify any treaty properly initialled by her responsible spokesmen. Tu recommending ratifies therefore, it is thought that th Privy Council would append a rider censuring the Ministry, the effect of which would be to Gring the Hamaguchi Cabinet toppling to the ground like a house of cards.
Admiral Takarabe,—the Navy Minister, before he left for London, th told a special session of the Pri Council that seventy per cent, of the auxiliary fleet strength of the American navy and seventy. per cent, of the big cruiser strength of the United States fleet were indls-Pensable to Japan and constitute the minimum required for the national needs, The stand of the Privy Council, ina nutshell, then, is as follows: Since the Navy ister, after conferring with his colleagues, definitely deciared that seventy per cent. of the total auxiliary strength and seventy per cent, of the big cruiser tonnage of the United States is the minimum needed for Japan's national security, there can be no reason for Japan making any concessions that sacrifice this minimum requirement of hers just merely to produce international goodwill and to reduce taxation. When Japan accepted a ratio of sixly per cent, in regard to battleships. at the Washington conference, nothing was said as regards auxil there was then a separate trea with regard to the Pacific.
Present conference has dealt with all classes of auxiliary vessels in such a manner that the.minimum Teqlairements, as set forth by responsible Navy men; have been sacrificed, The' Government practically foreed the compromise in the teeth of the opposition put forth by Tesponsible Navy men and such an attitude, the Privy Council. maintains, is reckless and imprudent, to say the least.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.