Jan, 19.
SHANGHAI'S situation as re-sards the interned soldiers is decidedly brighter than it was at the end of last week, Thanks to the public spirit of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce some thousands of, soldiers were embarked yesterday for their homes and the remainder will no doubt leave as soon as ships can be procured. It is curious that a beginning was not nade with the men in the Avenue Haig camp, whose position, both from their own and from the foreign point of view, is so much worse than that of their fellows in the other camps, But let us hope that the fact that they were not chosen to go first implies that they are going very soon, The soldiers, it is but fair to them to say, well under But it is none the less patent that they ought never to have been admit-and) Shenghai's earnest desire to see the last of them is accompanied by a resolve no less emphatic that such a thing must never happer again.
It is, therefore, urgent to consider calmly what can be done to prevent such an event or anything else of the like kind. And we are bound to say that the means at Shanghai's disposal to defend itself adequately are not what they ought to be. We are not thinking of the men and material, but of the system. While one lot of refugee soldiers is being shipped away, we are confronted with the extreme likelihood of another and larger mob being upon us in the very. near future. The fortunes of Marshal Chi, which appeared fairly promising a week ago, have suddenly clouded. Among General Lu's imported troops at Nanking, lent to him by Marshal Chang Tso-lin, were a body of Russians, White refugees Manchuria, apparently, whom we have heard more than once that he had enrolled. These men were shipped to Chinkiang on Friday, took it with great case and were reported yesterday to have pushed on 'o Tanyang, some twenty miles down the railway, Chi's troops falling back in disorder. The terror inspired by the Russians' name appears to be great and the prospects of Chi's army retreating pell-mell upon Shanghai are real andi menacing.
That the boundaries would be manned again as last September Wwe may assume as surely as that the defenders would do their duty unflinchingly. But this is not enough. The situation today is worse than it was in the tumn; that to-morrow is like-to be more serious than that of the day; new problems are certain to arise and, ay sai above, Shanghai is' very ill-equipped to meet them. The weakness of our position migh: be summed up as a lack of uni fied command; lack of a proper defined and reasonably defense ible boundary; lack of the: capable of, or, it would be fairer to say, who have the necessary power to take full responsibility for a quick decision and prompt action.
In saying this, we are not to be understood as blaming anybody in particular. Those with whom the safeguarding of [the Settlements rests are certainly far-more alive than we are to the weakness of the system which is the foundation of the trouble and we do not for a moment suggest that they are not doing their best. But their hands are tied. Take, for intance, the case of the refugee soldiers: their admission was, at any rate at the beginning, a case of force majeure. But the real boundary of Shanghai for purposes of defence is very much farther out into the country. If foreign cuards seized and held the two railways to a distance of ten or twenty miles from Shanghai and the losp line between them, they could effectively. paralyse all military action in this district; and in view of the extremely critical nature of the times and the vast interests situated in this area, such action would be amply justified. But /who is to take the responsibility of ordering it?
The Council necessarily takes and is allowed a great deal of responsibility. But it could hardly be expected to march the. 'S.V.C. out for work of this kind.
Moreover, it must work in concert with the Consular Body; it would not wish to fly in their faces, nor should it. And the Consuls, though doubtless fully alive to the situation, are bound to the Diplomatic Body, who in turn have to study the wishes of their Governments. Action ix delayed, under the most favourable conditions, for some day: when very likely circumstances call for a decision in fewer minutes. What is urgently needed is that the men on the spot should be vested with authority to act in emergencies they deem right jour waiting for permission from somebody hundreds of miles away who has but an imperfect knowledge of the situation. And for the expediting of action, the fewer that number of men may be, the better. Shanghai is, without exaggeration, faced with something very much resembling a war: and wars are not managed successfully by committees and boards of director:
One further point. We have always urged that the Powers should, as regards the whole contest in China, stand aloof and preserve a strict neutrality: and 30 far as the major issues are concerned, we trust they will continue to do so, But in respect of Shanghai and the surrounding district, we must hold that the time has come for them to take action and to employ: such measures will keep the fighting away from this area. That is purely a counsel of emergency, justified jas such and to be undertaken for local reasons only. The welfare of millions of Chinese, as well as foreigners, and Chinese wealth to an_incaleulabl amount are bound up in the peace of Shanghai, and any damage to this place would react on the fortunes of the people all through China. There would assuredly be no idea of attempting to dictate to the Chinese what government. they shall have, equally none of any acquit sition of territory or privilex: The interference we have in mind, which might take the form suggested above, of seizing the railways to a certain distance anghai and proclaiming 'a neutral zone, would be purely temporary expedient founded ea the necessities of local defence. There is precedent for in the events of the years 1854 and 1918 and even last autumn.
And justification would be
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.