Japan to patch up a modus vivendi agreeable to Japan, forget that this is a far more important underlying problem to China.
"At the present monont, ud agroement or arrangement agreeable to Japan would be other than destruc:
and repugnant to China."
Concerning the effort of the United States to ce-operate with Britain, the author recounts that, when things looked darkest in February, 1932, after a consultation with President Hoover, he raised with the British Ambassador the question of a joint invocation by Britain and America of the Nine-Power Treaty for the Purpose of stopping Japan, Anglo-U.S. Ca-operation After describing how, shortly afterwards, he urged the consent of Sir John Simon (then Foreign Secretary)
a trans-Atlantic telephone. conversation, Ca). Stimson proceeds:
talked with Sir John Simon again on the same subject in London on February 13 and 15, and while no explicit refusal of my suggestion was ever made, I finally became convinced from his attitude that the. British Government felt reluctant to, Join in.such a demarche, Therefore, T pressed no further."
Col. Stinson then sent his famous letter to Senator William E. Borah, reiterating America's adherence 10 the non-recognition doctrine, Pointing to the necessity of future ce-operation between the United States and Britain, Col. Stimson says:
"T emphasized our experiences of ce-operation with the British Government, because my confident feeling that in the ultimate development of collective action in Europe, whether through the present League or otherwise, it is inevitable that upon the 1 Government of Britain and her Dominions will fall the great responsibilities of leadership.
"I believe it is g.vital course that such leadership shall not be hampered, by the fear that collective action will be stabbed in the back by states SOVIET FORCE GATHER,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.