'The principle that domicile 1s the Sleariy and definitely. recognised England' until the decision Mesurier v. Lo Mesurier (1895, A.C. 517 and even after that decision the Indian Courts continued to exercise, under the Indian. Divorce "Act of 1009, a Jurisdiction based on residence only. "in Keyes v. Keyes and Gray '02i, P. 205), however, ft was held that ihe Divorce Courts in India had no jurisdiction to decree dissolution a marriage between parties not Gomletied in India, although the mi lage was celebrated and the Parties were resident in India end the adult {ery was committed. within thole Jurisdiction, "This decision was. not Courts and fe wes cisimed teat ast a rear Sardahip would" cnmue if divorce granted on proof of Gomlctle. "As a result the position was rogularised by the Indian and Solontal Divorce "Jurisdiction Act, 1928, which confersed a jurisdiction limbed as above to grant_a decree toa petitioner resident in India who by reason of oflelal duty or poverty oF other suficlent cause: cannot present a pelltion in the place of domi= tile." The provisions "of this Act ight, perhaps, be usefully extended fo China, In' the Scottish decision Grant v. Grant (1981, S.C. 238) which disposed of the remnants of the out: worn doctrine of Anglo-Indian domllie as far as persons of Scots domicll fare concerned, Lora. Morison me cidentally criticized the rigidity of {he doctrine of Lo Mesurler v. Lo Mesurier' regarding domicile as. the ole basis of divorce, as opposed 19 the broader conception of matrix monial domicile once followed in Scotland. The surrounding circum tances fu the present case, however, Seemed to me to support the respond: ents assurances that it was his pres-fent Intention to make his permanent home in this country and I accepted his evidence a3 to those clreumstences and that intention ey satisfactory Proof of his domicile here.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.