The Archive · 1926

Need for Troops in Manchuria

It became obvious that with the actually reduced strength of the garrison a satisfactory fulfilment ff its mission in such an extensive Zone was well-nigh impossible, was not doubted that both Marshal Chang 'Teo-lin and General Kuo 'Sung-lin had taken due note of the warning given by the Japanese com-Inander' and that in their military. operations they would fully respect the rights and interests of Japan. We could not, however, dismiss from our minds the apprehension that in the event of desperate engagements lasting for several days on all fronts the belligerents might unconsciously be driven to the railway zone to carry on street fighting and other forms of warlike operations. It has also happened in many past instances that remnant of a defeated army, let loose from al control and discipline, have. sacked towns and terrorized the population. Iaving regard to the imminence of such a danger, which manifested itself on December 15, the Government decided at once proceed with the reinstatement of the Japanese garrison in Manchuria to its normal strength, as maintained prior to the middle of November ast.

With the restoration of general peace in that region, following the decisive battle at the Liaoho, the supplementary troops, sent to Man-

Geseribed, were promptly recalled to their original posts and all the emergency measures came to an end, Tt will thus be observed thet] throughout the recent civil strife in China, as in the case of the Fengtien-Chihli conflict. of 1924, the Japanese Government have -'con-Sistently "followed a definite ani settled policy. It was announced Jin the last session of the Diet that an' the policy had in view (1) absolute non-interference in China's domestic: affairs and (2) the safeguarding of Japan's rights and interests. by all the legitimate means at our disposal.

An Answer to Critics are apparently certain sections of public opinion, which fare swayed by prejudice in their judgment of Japan's action in Manchuria, The reinstatement of our Manchurian garrison to its normal strength has been_misconstrued as helping the Fengtien army. The objection interposed by the Japanese commander against cither of the warring parties entering Yingkow has been mis 1D- represented as an act directed solely] against General Kuo Sung-ling's sion has been Japan in a false light. We deplore these unfounded and undeserved accusations and in denying them categorically we are confident that]

tory will be the final judge of our clear conscience Tt is a matter of satisfaction that our civil and military authori ties in Manchuria have successfully carried out: the policy of the Government solely in the interest. of humanity to save the lives of the soldiers and of the adherents of the vanquished party.

Tt is a well-known fact that} Japan possesses essential rights and interests, both corporeal and incorporeal, "in Manchuria and Mongolia. "Of such rights and terests those that have taken 1 tangible shape and are liable te! destruction by acts of war, are now mainly to be found along' the line of the South Manchurin Railway. In order to protect them from destruction we have been con: strained to make the necessary pro: vision, which has duly accomplished its end, With regard to our rights and interests of an immaterial kind, they did not seem likely to be effected by the war und we are satisfied that, they have in fact remained entirely unaffected,

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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