Jan, 12.
With the fall of Tsingtao and its occupa ton by Japanese naval forees, save for that portion of southern Shantung which the Chinese "have not. yet vacated, China's coastline from Shanhaikuan to Hangchow is now under Japanese military domination, That amounts to practically half its total Tength. "It is not to be expected that the Chinese will remain long in that portion of the province which is stil theirs, for the advance of the Japanese northwards from Pukow towards "Hsuchowfu must weaken! whatever resistance the Chinese contemplate offering along the Lunghai Railway in the defence works which have been under pre~ paration for some considerable time, and the gradual closing' of the gap between the Tapanese forces coming southwards and those advancing north is creating a trap from which the Chinese commanders will undoubtedly seek to extricate themselves by a vapid retreat to the west. Tsingtao has escaped much damage beyond that which was done to Japanese properties prior to the Aight of the Chinese authorities, and the fact that the city was handed over. in such comparatively good shape is largely due to the! foresight of the foreign residents who took! control with assistance of Chinese bodies and maintained peace and"good order during the interregnum. The task confronting the! Japanese in reorganizing Tsingtao should not bbe'a dificult one. Their previous adminis tration of the place was such as to commend Itself to the local Chinese to whom they will not appear the ogres they seem to be in localities to which Japanese control comes new experience. 'That, in all. probability accounts for the fact that, though large num. bors of Tsingtag Chinese' fled into the country side following the departure of Admiral Shen Hung-lich and his staff, they had already commenced to return a9 Soon as they realized that the situation had developed along lines which precluded any serious fight~ ing in defence of the city. En passant, reference may suitably, be made to the manner in which Admiral Shen governed the city during his term of office and the excellent way In which he was developing it.
This further Japanese success coincides with' two other important developments. "It is clear that the second German attempt to mediate between the'two warring countries has failed, and this is realized at a time when. the Japanese were about to hold an Imperial Conference, the fifth of its kind in Japanese! history. What will be decided at that august meeting, presided over by the Etnperor will probably be known by the time these lines appear, but the fact that ithas been called all' indicates that important and far-Yeaching decisions are about to be made. There can be no doubt about it: whether or not the. Imperial Conference decides, some observers believe it will, upon the prosecution of relentless warfare, there will certainly "be no amelioration " of Japan's present attitude towards China. Her terms for peace have been announced, they have been resolutely refused by the Chinese government, and all that remains for the Japanese is to seek to force acceptance of them by further military action. The pinion is held in some German quarters that the fall of Tsingtao is the prelude to engagement by the Japanese forces in adventures in south China, and that a drive on Canton is contemplated in the event of China remaining obdurate, That has long been anticipated and the picture of Japan in control of the whole of China's coastline comes with no dramatic suddenness, It would be inevitable in the prosecution of any plan contemplated under Japan's readiness to undertake a four year campaign, and the cutting of one of the remaining Chinese supply lines would appear to be'a prime military necessity in any such scheme. That it adds considerable gravity to the @itlook cannot be denied, but the fact has to be faced that at the moment there are absolutely no factors operating for peace, and while the Japanese might even now like to see a cessation of hostilities which must prove an increasing financial embarrassment to them there is no intention of stopping short of the attainment of their minimum desiderata, That neutrals will regard such a prospect with dismay is natural. Their trade with China is likely to suffer a lengthy period of dislocation, and the danger of further complications must increase with the lengthening of hostilities and their extension over a wider area, Those who believe that the financial state of Japan precludes the idea of a lengthy war should disabuse themselves of the idea. It] is true that Japan has been preparing for this] event for years past, and, if she had not, the Great War should be suf will still remain that though irregular bands may still continue t9 harass the invaders, it will be the harassment of armies in occupation, and can only hope to succeed by the attrition of Japanese resources which may take quite as long os the four-year-campaign which the Japanese contemplate, if not longer. China will look to Russia for anything more than material assistance in vain. Militarily, large though Russia's forees are, intervention is not yet possible, The Bolsheviks have] created a vast military machine, but apart} from the question of morale, the organization this machine is far ahead of the economic, technical and administrative development of] the country, and it is faced at present with the constant danger that mobilization of its} full strength would bring about a supply! crisis, even if there should be sufficient stocks]
material available. Tt will not be until this danger is removed that Russia may be regarded as a practical factor in the Far East, for though it might be able to fight a defensive war with success, intervention, which would require an offensive, cannot be contemplated until the whole of the Russian system is brought up to the efficient standards! of its army.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.