Apr, The decision of the Indian National Congress, as it is styled, on Lord Irwin's agreement with Mr. Gandhi provides the Viceroy with a concrete proof of the wisdom of his Policy. This does not mean that the revolutionary movement in India has been brought to an end, or even checked. The revolt taovement is in ree apart from the though the Congress, makes play with it and is at times its tool. The considerations which led Mr, Gandhi to come to terms at New Delhi have had, no doubt, much weight with the Congress. 'The main point is that Congress have endorsed the pact. It, therefore, agrees presentation at the Roun Conference, thus reversing its previous decision on that point. The riders, as the other resolutions may' be termed, may be merely face-saving clauses or, eventually, excuses for receding from the main position. That is a risk which Lord Irwin wa prepared to take and was right taking. The great principle
sentatives to the Round-Table, get the Congress, repre-'There they will come into cot tact with delegates representing other points of view. 'They will lose their confidence in their claim, which is preposterous on the face of it, to represent the whole of India' or even the whole of political India, and they may, therefore, bring their ambitions into a reasonable focus. The demand that India should have control of defence, of finance and foreign relations, and that she should have the right of independence, is patently an impossibility. Therefore, if the Round-Table Conference comes to practical conclusions, the Congress delegates will either have to fall in with the common line, or withdraw such of its representatives as consider the adherence to whatever de: are reached to This may be critic mitting uncertainty to continue. Tt has, however, the clear advantage of giving India breathing space. The Congress is not presentative of India, but-it is the best organized. political party. If the frame-ivory now to be completed develops into a practical form of federated government, the opportunities offered will be such that the best brains of the Congress are likely to realize the imperative necessity of continuing to ce-operate.
The interest in this decision at Karachi lies also in the fact that, it provides the first example of definite ce-operation by the Congress with the Government of India. It is a co-opera ation which has been secured by the Viceroy without condoning the Congress defiance of the law and without acceding to the original demand which fortified the Congress refusal last year to enter the Conference. {it is sheer misrepresentation. to suggest that there has been a surrender by the Viceroy of vital. principles. Mr, Churchill permitted himself to' make that Suggestion a few days ayo. He said that the 'Congress' had secured the whole-of the ferias which they' originally demanded for coming to the Kousd-Table Conference, terms which the Viceroy last August described as impossible. Let those terms be roughly recapitulated: There must be a right to refer British claims and concessions, including the public debt of India, to an independent tribunal for adjudication as to their justice or otherwise. There must be a total prohibition of liquor, a reduction of the rupee ratio from 1/6 to 1/4, a reduction of military expenditure by at least fifty per cent. to begin with, a reduction of the land revenue by fifty per cent. Not one of these terms is included in the settlements, Mr, Gandhi, indeed, gave up his very recent demand for investigation into alleged police excesses and at one time it seemed us if the Viceroy's firmness on this point would prevent the settlement from being made. The only doubtful factor in the settle ment is the differentiation between a political boycott and a boycott of industrial character. 'The political boycott Mr. Gandhi has agreed shall go.' If the boycott of the other kind is rely to take the form of a paign in favour of the purchase of Indian goods, there is no difficulty in its acceptance. If, on the other hand, the interpretation placed on this under-Standing involves peaceful pjekering, the outbreak at Cafvnpore sufficiently shows where the dangers lie, It is fairly certain, however. that the Gorernment of India are alive to this point. If they are not, it may be surmised that the pow ful trade union and commerce: interests in Eny id will ensure their alertness In siting up the situation a cautionary note is to be sound-For many years past the Government of" India's weak point has been its publicity organization. Lord Northcliffe endeavoured, without effect, to induce Lord Reading to stimulate Simla and Delhi to a sense of the importance of this machinery ten years ago. But there is little doubt' that, judged by English standards, the publicity arrangements in Simla and Delhi have been pathetic to a degree. A good deal of this is due to the fact that the Constitution threw the publi Montagu-Chelmsford departments to the inhospitab care of the the Government's opponents could hardly be expected to smile on a strong publicity department. But the Indians have not, been to blame entirely. A good deal i must attach to the Service which. with all its merits, has an almost feminine jealousy of the expert from outside. So the publicity departments "have been ham-strung by official half-heartedness on the one hand and political hostility on the other. This digression is necessary. The telegrams from India must be interpreted with the knowledge that the Mr.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.