The Archive · 1937

UNFOUNDED FEARS

Although Dr. H. H. Kung less than two months ago obtained from s personal contacts in London the assurance that the reported -Anglo-Japanese conversations could not prejudice Sino-British relationships or develop in the Far East policies unfavourable ќo China, there has of late been a revival of Chinese un-mess on that point. Fuel has been given to this speculation by certain expansive utterances in the Japanese press which more sue is apt to give hospitality to political kites of other {han diplomatic origin, That the Chinese Government does not endorse the suspicions entertained by such cri may be gathered from Dr. Wang Chung-hui's recent conversation with certain Japanese reporters to whom he expressed the view that both Great Britain and Japan shared his opinion that any Anglo-Japanese understanding should respect China's territorial sover-eighty and administrative integrity and secure consultation with China on issues directly affecting her. Generally the argument that China has reason to be uneasy over the possible consequences of an Anglo-Japanese understanding is based on the traditional belief that China profits most from disagreements between the other Powers. Specifically, too, it is contended that in [the search for a solution of their economic differences he two nova? Powers will be inclined to compromise on their interests in Chin" with the result that by recognizing certain "spheres of influence", to use the old term. of power-diplomacy, they will implicitly do violence to China's integrity.

Moreover this mode of agreement may be associated with diplomatic concessions which will perhaps include recognition of the State of Manchoukuo, to China's prejudice. The peculiarity of the present regime in the North is also judged tu lend itself to an unholy disregard of China's fundamental rights ther The conversations, happily in fiated in London by Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, and discreetly stimulatd by Prince Chichibu's tactful renewal of English friendships during his visit to the Coronation, have no! produced any public announcement on which definite comment can be appropriately made. It is sufficient: at the moment to observe, that the desire of Japan to repair certain gaps in her relations with Great Britain has been freely noted in the Japanese press from the beginning of the present year. The settlement of the Keelung incident was held to pave the way for conversations to which the visit of Prince Chichibu was considered to add authority. It should be recalled, however, that in Japan and especially in England, the evidence that the Japanese Government was showing favour to a more "rational" policy in China was adduced to justify faith in the success of such conversations. It seems clear, therefore, that neither Japan nor Great Britain is under any delusion on the importance of fully respecting China's essential rights among which her integrity and sovereignty stand supreme. In other words the reversion of Japan to what in British eyes is a "more orthodox" policy toward China has formed the main basis to the proposed conversations. London spokesmen also made it clear that by reserving liberty to apprise the United States of America of the progress of the conversations and by keeping China's newly-consolidated unity fully in mind, there could be no danger of reviving fears of a return to the discredited methods of old-time power diplomacy in the Far East.

Even if these considerations are lightly regarded, there are further solid arguments which give them reinforcement, should that process be necessary, Great Britain is still bound by the policy of the Chamberlain Memorandum of 1926 and has therefore to be guided by certain general principles designed to safeguard the integrity and independence of China, to promote her political and economic development and rehabilitation of her finances.

In the light of the support given by Great Britain to Dr. H. H. Kung's monetary reforms scheme this passage in the memorandum has special pertinence. If those who feel unable to gauge the possibilities of British policy would glance at the history of the last few years they should find illuminating guidance Committed to faith in the collective system through the Covenant of the League of Nations, Great Britain has been loyal to the League in the handling of the Manchurian problem and, more recently still, in regard to Abyssinia. At the present moment the combined efforts of the British and French Governments, in association with the majority of European states, are being directed toward observance of the same principles for application to. the situation in Spain, Great Britain's hope is that by the conversations with Japan the danger of drift in the Far East may be avoided and a contribution may be made to th: development of a rapprochement between China and Japan for the greater stabilization of the political and economic conditions in e Pacific. The Chinese Government, judging from Dr. Wang Chung-huis statement is satisfied on that point as the result of the friendly announcement made by Mr. Anthony Eden in May. It is not likely to be betrayed into the belief that the Anglo-Japanese conversations give the signal for revival of the old technique which plays one power off against the other, any more than for the British or Japanese Governments to contemplate a combined endeavour to exert pressure in this or that direction. Japan is too astute not to recognize the fidelity with which British statesmen have adhered to their declared policy in regard both to China and to the League. If she entertains—as her British friends undoubtedly hope she does entertain—the friendly ambition to smooth out the asperities of recent differences between herself and Great Britain she is well advised of the premises on which such an enterprise may be successfully essayed. Those premises exactly preclude any development which could conceivable undermine China's integrity. or friendship with Great Britain, 4

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