srocat 70 run "c, MEMALD"
A British oficial pronouncement: has accepted the assurances of both Chinese and Japanese Governmen's [that the clash provoked at the Marco Polo Bridge on July 7 was not premeditated. "The practical value of {nls denial of premeditation, as disinet from the academic apportion ment of responsibility, ler in the ostensible assumption which follows that neither side plans to produce {from the incident a pretext for making war on a large scale The Chinese Government, for its part, de-Jclares that it secks peace, provided its national prestige can be preserved. The Japanese Government also seeks }pesee, provided its declared potiey In China is safeguarded. In conside these rival protestations of affection for peace, it. is appropriate to examine the positions of the two parties.
China, it is admitted, has made sweeping improvements in her rullitary organization. She has eradic~ ted defects from its administration 1d the Central Government. troops re well-trained and well-equipped—up to a point. This undoubtedly strengthens her capacity for defence against aggression, but that eapicity must not be overrated. The operations of w'large miliary force in furtherance of a definite object which here must imply defeat of a foreign Jarmy encamped upon the sell, demand consideravie preparation in the rear. Even if the ability to feed, clothe and train the Chinese soldier [be granted and his transport costs Uttle, the problem must be finally /geverned by the actual: condition of the railway communications. jeomprise certain main lines linking important centres, The; tolatly inadequate to cope with Jscale movements of troops. Kwangtung and Kwangsi, for example, have indicated their readiness to go nort plates and knives and whatever Required for the midday meal by the roadside. A thermos—better still, two—is essential.
Regarding clothes it depends on the time of year and the region you are visiting. But two points are important: firstly always be prepared for wet weather and have an umbrella handy; secondly wear your old clothes in the car, as they will certainly get. soiled.
Finally a few words of general advice:—
Check everything yourself before starting each day and do not trust the chauffeur: water in the radiator, engine oil, petrol and tyres, The atter require checking at least once towards midday, as they expand after a Jong run, and if not let down, you are liable to get a burst tyre.
Do not stop to ask any official person for information (police, Soldiers or bus-station people). Not only will you get none, but you will at once be held up with questions and demands for inspection of papers etc.
Sound your horn at all corners; the other fellow doesn't, Go slow through villages and where there are people on the road ahead; they are lable to jump across from one side to the other in front of the car, if only "to cut off their devil."
Remove your spare wheel and all other loose parts every night and put them inside the car which should be locked; otherwise you are liable to lose them.
'Do not take all the stories you hear about bandits too seriously. On the other hand, if you get a warning from some' really responsible source, make sure before you go on, Do' not travel at night in. the wilder districts, if you can avoid it, Discount by 50 per cent, all you fare told about distances and the state of the road, unless your informant has been over if himself Try and keep your temper as much as possible, I do not off this advice for the reasons usually urged, but solely for considerations of health. Indeed, it is quite untrue, as some people will tell you—including, I believe, the handbook of the Automobile Club of China—that you only do harm by losing your temper. On the contrary, a sudden cgitburst will often prove surprisingly effective. But on a trip of this kind you' will have occasion, to lose your temper at least halt a dozen times a day, and will soon be worn out, The transport of their forces 10 any considerable extent is virtually impossible without exposure to Jong delays which would invite enemy faction, on sea and Jand, and make their chances of reaching'the north-jem front exceedingly remote.
Tt may be surmised therefore that [Ching's resistance to aggression would be sirietly on the defensive basis if attempted of all, Japan's Steady Advance The Japanese position is different, linne local problem of disposing of provincial Chinese troops cannot be Bald to be the primary objective, To fsrrive at that, it is necessary to indulge in retrospection, In 1931 out of Jocal incident at Mukden, Japan put {orth her military strength, to control the three North-Eastern provinces. Her. plans seemed to develop met odically; actually she was drawn further and further to the other side fof the then Chinese Eastern Rail~ way by the relentless logie of events. [For example, in November 1931, yas atlzming that she would never cross that railway or even have Jonything to-do with the former Emperor of Ching By the end of [November she was attacking sisi har. By the following April, the former Emperor had been installed og Chief Executive of Manchoukuo, later became the Emperor Kang Ten," Similarly there was no deliber= fate intention to take Jehol, judging fom official doctorations, but In the winter of 19923, Jehol was duly absorbed into Manchoukuo and a de~ finite part of Hopel attached to it for {the purpose, to say nothing of a strip of the Mukden Peiping line as far Jas Shanhailewan, Penetration—into Charhar naturally proceeded. It re~ ceived a special stimulus from events fu Hopel in the summer of 1935 when the Fast of the former Man= churian armies was evicted, the Ho-Umetsu agreement created the Hopei-[Charhar Political Couneit which soon found itself. flanked on the east by the East Hopel autonomous regime developed from the demilitarized zone under the said Sviyuat a Mongolian 1 by Manchoukuo troops was unsuecess~ 401 In the winter of 1036-37. Easier Fhowever, in "September 1936, the Japanese had secured another' foot~ iota in Hopel by taking the opportunity of a local' incident to occupy Fengtai and so complete their domination of the Peiping-Mukden and Peiping-Suiyuan railway lines,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.