It is clear from the speech of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on Monday that the differences between him and Mr. Anthony Eden were really not so great as was at first believed, for the assurance, that he gave, that the British Government would desire to obtain the League's approval for any agreement which might be made with Italy, indicates that it is still his desire to reach a settlement acceptable to the League as a whole, Whether this is an afterthought arising out of Mr. Eden's resignation, or something of which the latter knew before he took the step he did is not known, but if the Prime Minister had made that clear when the dispute first arose it is somewhat difficult to understand the attitude Mr. Eden adopted. The British Government, Mr, Chamberlain said, regarded the settlement of the Spanish problem as essential to any agreement. So, it is believed, did Mr. Eden, but Mr. Chamberlain suggests that the real crux of the whole matter was a difference of opinion as to Italian good faith in the whole matter. The former Foreign Secretary was dubious; the Prime Minister, on the other hand, is confident that the Italian Government will approach the negotiations in the same spirit as the British, namely in perfect good faith and with a desire to reach agreement. It has to be admitted that Mr. Eden's opinion is founded on what has already occurred, for, whatever may have been the reason for some of Italy's diplomatic manceuvres in the past, it has been apparent for some considerable time that there was a strong suspicion in "some influential British circles concerning Italian bona fides. Even Mr. Chamberlain is not prepared to admit that the actions of Italy in the past have been satisfactory to him, but there is much more value in his addition to that sentence of the phrase "but I am concerned with the future and not the past."
That is very clearly the opinion of the majority of the Cabinet which would not have supported the Prime Minister had it been otherwise. Great Britain has to be concerned with the future and if she decides to overlook what has happened in the past and negotiate with Italy at Rome, she has in taking that decision given ample evidence of her good faith vis-a-vis of Italy, and by the Prime Minister's assurance regarding the League vis-a-vis of its members.
Nevertheless the decision of the majority of the Cabinet is a serious one. If there has been no change of the Italian heart, if a final settlement is not reached because of intransigeance over one or other of the Italian essentials the inevitable failure of the negotiations would amount to a severe rebuff to the Cabinet and the British Empire, with the result that that situation would be considerably worsened instead of improved. Italian acceptance of the British formula regarding Spain may, and should be accepted as an indication of good faith, as really showing an inclination to settle the matter once-and for all. The rate of progress towards a settlement will present a test of Italian intentions. Recognition of the Italian Empire in Abyssinia, upon which italy has so consistently insisted, need not prove an insuperable stumbling block. Mr. Chamberlain has formally given the assurance that whatever agreement is reached will be submitted to the League for approval. It is inconceivable that Britain would go to the League and ask it to approve of a settlement including such recognition in view of its present attitude in the matter. It is, nevertheless, possible that the League itself may find it desirable to change its policy in that regard, especially in view of the disposition of certain countries to change their own outlook on the subject, and if the Italian Government were to consent to let this question remain in abeyance for the time being, there seems to be little reason why other outstanding problems should not be solved and a contribution thereby made to the peace of Europe. It is obvious, therefore, that Mr. Chamberlain desires to effect a compromise with Italy in which concessions will have to be made on both sides, not the least important of which would be for Rome, to drop, at least for the time being, its insistence upon recognition of the Empire.
The gravity of Mr. Chamberlain's decision is not only national, as has already been shown, but also personal. Should he fail to come to some agreement with Italy he will have met with a diplomatic reverse which may sadly affect ultimate historical estimates of his career. That may be a little matter to him in view of the gravity of the situation. Itis
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.