Feb, 25.
The military situation after four weeks has now developed to a point which makes it impossible to regard the enter pri in which Japan is engaged as involving anything leas than major operations. It. may be that the key lies in Japan itself where the reaction of public to the delay in restoring censorship. The financial situation of Japan is no better than that of many other countries. The cost of repairing the blunder of Admiral Shiosawa is likely to be exceedingly heavy. How heavy it is impossible to determine at the moment, The offensive Jaunched—by Lieut,-General Uyeda has been first slowed down and now apparent is in danger of being held up, Goi sympathy. surgeon who has been called in at a late hour to handle a very difficult case. He is probably too good a soldier not to hav realised the enormous difficult of the terrain in which he was compelled to operate. He has obviously been hampered first of all by the stringent need for avoiding damage to the Settle ment, and secondly—because Japan, in order possibly to maintain with the League of Nations the fiction that she is not at war with China, has been unable to prevent the passing of Chinese reinforcements nto the Shanghai area, It may be surmised that the bombing of Soochow is a clear indication of lan intention to ignore this more or less technical difficulty in future, General Uyeda may also have realised that the task before him required a larger number of troops, but in view of the political situation in Japan he felt that it would be necessary for him to give a plain demonstration of that point before effective reinforcements could de sent to him. The accumula tion of these difficulties hia been in one respect mitigated. In spite of the enormous enhancement of Chinese morale, military and political, directly accruing from this situation, the Gov ment of China has'not yet been able to assume a less shadowy form, There is no sign of any cal cohesion. Political pre-Gudices appear to be a in-Veterately fissiparous as ever, and if the eu events were not so momentous the plight of the politicians would be almost a matter for amusement.
Military. experts, no doubt, have formed their own con: clusions as to the requirements of the Japanese Army for carry fug out the declared task of clearing the Shanghai-Woosung area, The Chinese troops in this area are now estimated to be somewhere in the neighbourhood of 40,000. They have been busily engaged in digging in. 'They have all the advantages of a Wefending side, of special know-Jedge of the country, of an ability to live on the' country, and of the exceedingly difficult ground over which the operations have (o be conducted. Tt would seem as if the Japanese Army, taking into account its marvellous and very up-to-date equipment, -will require no less than 50,000 troops to achieve its purpose. The political difficulty of such reinforcement is plain. If serious notice was ever given to the idea that Japanese action was solely concerned with the defence of the Settlement, it is} obviously ruled quite out of court when 60,000 troops are in question. It could hardly be! contended that 50,000 troops! were necessary to protect 20,000: Japanese, of whom 8,000 have been' evacuated since the trouble began.
For Japan it is in the main a war for prestige, but even prestige can be purchased at too high a price. The longer the situation here remains in the present indeterminate condition, the greater strain must be thrown on Japanese forces in Manchuria. Whatever interests pan may have in China proper, there can be little doubt that Manchuria is, uppermost in the policy and minds of her statesmen, Prestige lost on the Yangtze might be well lost. thereby the Manchurian position could be secured. These are factors which should be taken into account. The financial position of Japan can, and probably would, be made to stand the complete assertion of Japanese plans'in Manchuria so far as they do not involve, as they are supposed not to involve, permanent occupation. Can it bear the additional strain of a hu campaign, the end of which cannot be foreseen? Even if the Japanese were able to clear the "Shanghai-Woosung area of Chinese forces, their army might still be faced with the necessity for preserving the clearance and, perhaps, for taking further operations against an elusive enemy. Looking back over the ast four weeks, it may be asked whether the time has not come to revise rigidly the views previously held regarding the importance of prestige. It is not necessary to insist on the miscalculations which led to the present impasse. But no friend of Japan can, with equanimity view the acceptance of military commitments 0 indeterminate and so sinister in their possible political and financial effects. It comes to this, the Japanese Government have to make up their minds to clear the ground and define a definite policy to the execution of which they must bend their hitherto irrepressible military advisers. At present whatever policy they possess is absolutely at the mercy of the" armed argument. It has been carried out of the plane of constructive statesmanship and sound international relations,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.