Part IIT, of this Chapter finally deals with "the attitude of the inhabitants of Manchuria towards the new "State." The Commission starts by explaining that, owing to the circumstances in which the enquiry had to be made, the obtaining of evidence on this point presented some difficulties. The exceptional measures of protection "taken to safeguard the Commission. against dangers, real or supposed, had the effect of keeping away witness Many Chinese were frankly afraid of even meeting the members the Commission. itself. Interviews were therefore arranged with considerable difficulty and secrecy. But spite of these difficulties, private interviews were arranged" with Dusiness men, bankers, teachers, doctors, police, "tradesmen—and others, in addition to the public interviews with various authorities The Commission also received cover 1500 written communications, some delivered by hand, the majority sent by post to different addresses. The information so. rec was checked as far as possible from neutral sources. The Commission then, goes on to explain the state of mind of each group of the popula~ tion with "whom it has" Been in touch, and finally comes tothe conclusion that, if ""Manchakuo" seems to be supported by certain minority groups, "there faneral Chinese "support, for the Manchukuo Government," which is regarded by the local Chinese, as Instrument of the Japanese."
Chapter VIE: Japanese Economic Interests and the Chinese Boycott Chapter VII draws attention to the fact that the struggle between China and Japan is not only of a military, but also of an economic nature, China using as a weapon gainst Japan the boycott of goods, ships, banks, etc., thus aiming at the complete severance of economic and financial relations with the other country.
The Commission, after having pointed out that increased industrialisation and export of manufactured goods is) one. of the Prinelpel means looks as a solution for her popu should support the boycott movement, but only wishes to point out that oficial encouragement volves a measure of Government of ernment that the boycott is a legitimate weapon of defence against military aggression by a stronger country, especially in cases where methods of arbitration have not previously been. utilised, raises, according to the Commission, a question of 2 much wider character. No one can deny the right of the individual Ci nese to refuse to buy Japanese goods, or the right of the Chinese, acting individually or in organised bodies, to make used do. not fringe the laws of the land.
Whether, however, the organised application of the boycott to. the trade of one. particular country' is consistent with friendly relations or in conformity' with treaty" obliga tions is rather & problem of international law than a subject for the enquiry of" the Commission. The hope ig expressed by the Commis j|sion that in the interests of all [States this problem should be considered at an early date, and ogulated by international "agree-
The Chapter closes by stating that the interdependence of the trade of China and Japan and the interest of, both call for an Jeconomie rapprochement, but that there can be no such rapprochement so long as the political relations between them are so unsatisfactory as to call forth the use of military force by one, and the economic force of the boycott by. the other.
Chapter VILL: Economic Interests in Manchuria Shapter VIT deals briefly with economic interests in Manchuria, especially those of China and Japan. For the detailed study of these interests it refers to special memoranda annexed to the Report, which cover such questions as investments; Japan's economic ee-Intions with " Manchuria; Chin ith that region; the chance for Japanese immigration to Manchuria; the part played by China's immigration to Manchuring Railway. and currency question. In this Jchapter' the Conimission expresses its conviction that Japanese and Chinese economic interests in Mar jeburia, taken in themselves and apart from the political events of recent years, would Jead to mutual understanding and ce-operation, and not to conflict. Their reconciliation is necessary if the existing resources and future economic possibilities in Manchuria are [developed to the fullest possible points out that it is this plea of [justification which makes—this particular conflict at once so complicated and so serious. The Commission has not thought it its Hfanetion to argue the issue, but it has tried to provide sufficient material to enable the League of Nations to settle the dispute consistent with the honour, - dignity fand national interests of both. the contending parties. Criticism alone will not accomplish this: there must also be practical efforts toward conciliation.
Unsatisfactory suggestions of settlement: (2) Restoration of the Status qo ante.
(2) The maintenance of "Man-mere restoration of the tata quo onte would be no solu-[tion. Since the present conflict sTose out of the conditions prevailing before last September, to restore these conditions would merely be to invite a repetition of the trouble. It would be to treat the whole question therotically, and to Teave out of account the realities of the situation.
The maintenance and recognition regime in "equally satisfactory. "Such a solu tion does not appear to the Commission compatible with the fundamental principles of existing international obligations, nor with [the good understanding between the [two countries upon which peace in the Far East depends. It is op-[posed to the interests of China. it disregards the wishes of the people Jof Manchuria, and it is at' least questionable whether it would ultimately serve the permanent interests of Japan.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.