An appreciable change has taken place during the past few months in the way in which the American public assesses the character of tht British Prime Minister, Mr. Neville Chamberlain. His policies are looked upon with far more favour and his objective are better understood. He started with little in his favour as far as the American public was concerned.
During the time he acted as Chancellor of the Exchequer he was associated with the failure to pay war debts and some entirely justified, if not particularly diplomatic, comments made by him on the mentality of the Middle West with regard to international problems in general and the war debts in particular rankled, and were continually being recalled.
Then on top of this came the Cabinet split over foreign policy with Mr. Eden, who (being young, handsome and idealistic) had become a personality who was popular, even if the precise points in wHich he differed from the Prime Minister were little understood. in has now lived down this early attitude of indifference and, at times, hostility The reason for the change could be summed up in a sentence. He apears to be making an attempt to give conscious guidance to events towards a well-defined goal instead OF letting matters drift. The- Anglo-Ita agreement, followed by the Anglo- and the greements in quick succession, made a deep impression in the United States.
Action had taken the place of inaction. Something was being done to prevent the drift in Europe towards twa hostile camps. The Administration began to appreciate the worth of the Chamberlain policy before the general public, and the President broke all precedent by publicly endorsing the Anglo-Italian agreement in a formal statement.
Since the days of George Washington, who, warned his countrymen that Europe had a set of primary interests which "to us have remote interest" the United States Government has taken particular care not to take any part in Europe's political affairs.
The President, therefore, prefaced his remarks with a restatement of this traditional position. The United States Government, he said, "Does mot attempt to pass on the political features of accords such as that recently reached between Britain and Italy."
Having made this reservation the President then went as far as was politically possible in approving Mr. Chamberlain's policy. "This Government has seen the conclusion of an agreement with sympathetic interest because it is proof of the value of peaceful negotiations,"
The importance of the President's statement was immediately recognized. It was praised by many, criticized by some. It appears to have caused consternation in English opposition circles who "had been basing much of their case against the Government on the assumption that it had "alienated" American public opinion and embarrassed the American Government by its attempts to come to terms with the authoritarian states.
Yet here was the head of the American Government saying that these verbally castigated negotiations had proved the value of peaceful negotiations. In a debate on the Italian agreement Mr, Herbert Morrison suggested that the Prime Minister should not quote the remarks of President Roosevelt with such unction for they were merely 2 routine gesture such as one government often makes to another. American opinion does not bear out Mr. Mofrison's contention.
Nobody has considered the remarks routine and many exercised their ingenuity in suggesting reasons why they had been made.
One suggestion was that Mr, Roosevelt had become irritated at the way in which the British Opposition parties had used nim as a stick to beat the Government. Mei bers of these parties had called upon him at the White House and had been listened to with courteous attention and then had given the impression that the President had agreed with the position they had outlined. The opposition press also had over-reached itself in outlining what purported to be the President's hostile reaction to the policy of were if it were shown to be an essential feature of a general appeasement." This statement, comments the journal, "while suggesting the motives of the Chamberlain policy, implies that recognition of the Italian conquest is not to be regarded as a precedent. The British Government is uneasily aware of the dangers inherent in the initiative it has agreed to take.... The truth is that the international policies of today are emergency policies, expedients adopted to avoid greater' evils.
This final sentence, expressed in different ways, contains a sentiment which is heard widely in the United States today. Americans who take an interest in foreign politics reluctantly admit that part of the trouble in the world today has been the failure of countries to accept the lesser of two. evils.
By rejecting the lesser evil they have not encompassed the good but have paved the way for the greater evil. A refusal to compromise with Germany on her armament demands led to her vast armaments of today, a refusal io permit an Austro-German Customs union,.or the return of the Hapsburgs to the Austrian throne, led to the absorption of Austria by Germany, and the tejection of the Hoare-Laval plan to sacrifice part of Haile Selassies Empire led to the complete conquest of Ethiopia.
It might be ideally desirable for all the world to be democratic and peaceful, but the world must be accepted as it is, If to adopt a Biblical metaphor the kid refuses to lie down with the lion, the lion wil very probably try: to eat him. the British Government, Another suggestion was that some species of intrigue had taken place between the British Government and a section of the permanent staff in the State Department. A letter, ran one version of the story, had been written personally by Mr. Chamberlain io Mr. Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State, asking him to persuade the President io issue the statement, This tale was repeated in such a widespread fashion that the permanent officials of the Department finally had to take note of it and deny it categorically.
On its face it was absurd to anyone who knew the President, He is the very last man to have his opinions formed for him by others and a suggestion from abroad that he should adopt a certain line of action would immediately have been repudiated and resented.
It is quite possible that the Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, ent a personal memorandum to his American colleague outlining more frankly his objectives than would be possible in a public statement. But there is nothing very unusual about that.
The simplest explanation is probably the true one, namely that the President felt th the Chamberlain policy was the. only pos. sible one to follow if war to be averted and wished to give it what encouragement he could. ecs There have always been two schools of thought on foreign policy within the ranks of the Administration. One group took the position that the United States had no concern with the informal form of government which a country chose to adopt. Its sole concern was with its external policy. It repudiated the idea that the United States
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.