Oct. 26, If the trail of Mr, Matsuoka accurate development of J: to command the sinews of war lor whether it should be capitalisled for the benefit of a permanent peace. Thad is where the Lytton Report, in handling [Far Eastern issues, is so sage la, mentor. Two points are likely to come clearly out into the open: the need for Japan to ce-ordinate her policies in Manchuria and China proper respecment on that account, The: difficulty of her situation has special peculiarities. With the military in the saddle, the Gov-jemment at Tokyo must rely rather on' repression of popular: discontent than on liberal adjustments of policy. The outspoken comment of certain Japanese organs, to which this it might be, that the Manchurian winter with its fierce severity, is fin itself a heavy handicap' to [Japanese military disposition General Ma Chan Shan's resis tance on the Nonni River was Ihelped in no small degree by the lelimatic conditions. There little doubt that the badly equip-journal's Tokyo correspondent ibe ped volunteers and bandits. will hard pressed by the winter. tively; the desirability of assist-referred in his despatch publish-_ Dlem a marked change is in projing Russia, if possible, to parti-Jed yesterda; rmptomatic They will be able, however, to ess at Tokyo. Mr. Matsuoka, in cipate in the general settlement rely on local customs and resourperhaps of certain school of the early part of this year, eventually reached: thought. It by no means re-lees for their resistance to. the bitter cold, with which the Man-arrived in Shanghai to herald a Japanese opinion is nevertheless [presents the opinion of the mass distinct modification of, the vaguely conscious that it is no of the people who are well churian bandit has long learnt Japanese attitude toward the longer practicable to have. two imbued with the conviction that lhow to contend. They may lose events then exercising the policies, one for Mar heavily in reduction of their ithe policy of General Araki and public mind. No-one believes and one for the rest of Count Uchida is right and the effective strength but, in opera-thet Japan's' basic contentions jonly means of solving the {ions of this kind, the advantage lear that any solution of is often on the side of the irre-regarding the importance of a the problem of Manchuria which pressing problems of the moment. stable Manchuria to her own Jgnored the important. interests Despite the serious financial salar forces, unhampered as they econdmie existence have been of the U.SS.R. would risk a position, the suggestion that fare by elaborate transport Weakened. They receive full future breach of the peace and Japan is faced with a grave rangements, text-book rules and General Staff calculations. recognition from the—Lytton would not be permanent." political and constitutional up-Commission and from all who is possible to detect in these fheaval is not endorsed by those However tight may be the have attempted fairly to gauge two sentences the germ recently in touch with affairs Japanese control of the Man-the complexities of the issue. agreement, given sincerity of there. "It is impossible not to lchukuo administration it is safe Nor is it necessary to do more Intention on all sides. admire the vigour with which the to say that the need for using than lightly indicate the serious Expression of a desire to men at the top are persevering in that administration as a screen finanefal possibilities involved ce-operate in the support of a jas severe a test of fortitude and must throw on the military a in an attempt to press the central government in China, sacrifice ever imposed upon a heavier burden than would Present policy in Manchuria to. coupled with attention to the nation. The readiness with lace rue from treatment of the its logfeal conclusion in defiance unsettled conditions prevailing which the people of Japan accept whole country as enemy coun-of world-opinion and without here, is essentially—different the leadership of the present try. What General Ssu Ping the consent of China, Success from a magnification of China regime is, perhaps, the cause of wen has been doing between might be achieved. but, in the disorder and disorganization surprised' resentment at the re-'Tsitsihar and Manchuli can ight of General Honjo's recent order to justify actions. on fatal of outside opinion to be be repeated elsewhere. In or admissions, it would demand a fyhich, to put it" mildly, grave equally complaisant in endorsing lxanising Manchukuo troops to Tongedvavn out series of oper divergence of opinion ' exists. contentions sedulously put for-lassist in clearing the country, the tions throwing on the heavily The former frame of mind ward to vindicate Japan's policy.
Japanese are taking risks which burdened Japanese nation accords with the Lytton Com-While, therefore, the notion that.
Ihave already materialized and load of crushing dimensions, It mission's desire to concentrate Japan is being driven into the may continue to material Says much for the splendid, if.
Jon the arrangement of the janns of Russia looks exceedingly Defection of Manchukuo units, not always well-advised, patriot-future; the latter runs counter plausible in Tokyo and in quar armed and equipped, is ism and discipline of the to the Commission's deprecation ters susceptible to Japanese aggravating factor in' the pro~ Japanese nation that so des-lof undue emphasis on culpabili-Jassertions, it is more critically blem. "It may be argued that all perate a measure can be re~ ties. In this connection it is examined elsewhere, The chief this was to be expected. It may garded as possible. The re-possible to see significance in matters which Mr. Matsuoka, on be asked, however, whether it was ception accorded to the Lytton the present interchange of hos-Ihis way to Geneva, will have to really foreseen by the Japanese Report on its fist appearance pitality between the Japanese discuss with Moscow are General Staff when it. committed suggested that there was no Minister to China and General other vay" out, Happily, "it cognition of Manchukuo and the fisheries, oil, supplies, the re-itself to the putsch of September 1931, Taking the - Man-Chang Hsueh-liang at Peking, resent Messages are" tobe Japanese public opinion has [geographical delimitation of choukuo administration as the key credited, something of a sea-late been highly sensitive to Japanese influence in Manchuri to Japanese policy it must be change has come over Japanese criticisms which, it has, not On the first two points at all confessed that the preliminary thought. It cannot be attribut-unnaturally but still incorrect. levants: a measure of agreement Peace and Order Committees, ed to the emergence from the ly, assumed, have betokened ig believed to have been secured. which were the—legitimate full version of the Keport of fundamental hostility fo Tokyo. [There remains the question of parents of that infant points missed in the official Nothing would do more to ithe Chinese Eastern Railwa; could have been regarded as summary, Seldom has such a disarm such criticism than With that the other two issu summary of an important docu-adherence by Japan to the line Jare closely concerned. Moscow Manchurian independence only ment. boon so. comprehensive indicated by Mr. Ariyoshi's may be thrilled at the prospect by blindness, refusing to see lof alienating Japan from the what it did not want to see. and so free from criticism by Fecent speech and, now, Mr. capitalist Powers. It may be Looking back it would seem as if those subsequently reading the Matsuoka's apparent declara-complete text. On the other tions to London. It has often doubted whether even Sovi jan incurable optimism dogged diplomacy will be equal to th Japanese actions. The weakness hand closer study of the Report been asserted that Japan. will task of straddling the traditional lof the Peace and Order Com-has probably convinced sober' not stand before the League in policy of Russia in the Far East mittee was thought to be opinion in Japan of the folly of white sheet. The Lytton I—a legacy hitherto accepted by leradicable by the creation of the interpreting the Commission's Commission refuses to be party (Moscow—and acquiescence in all next expression of Manchurian findings with the prejudice to any such proceeding. It the logical consequences of the autonomy. And so the process engendered by precipitate and, equally perceives, as do others creation of Manchukuo. A modus continued. General Honjo has mainly, anticipatory, accugati of the "middle of the road," the vivendi is possible; a definite been credited with a demand for against the Commission's imcorollary: China must be assur-partiality ang fair-mindedness, ed the same immunity. If the rapprochement on ' a political When the history of the delegates from the two coun-basis between the two countries present time comes to be written, tries observe that, forbearance, Imay be possible but its probabi is insecurely founded. the financial resources available? it may be found - that the the chances of extracting from The measure of the seriousness desperate avoidance by nations the forthcoming discussions a Those who blithely believe of the problem can be gauged Of n plunge into another: world: practical and useful contribution that Japan is fully alive to the from the report that the conflict has been mainly dictate to the much-desired agreement Inature of the task confronting Japanese authorities are looking ed'by the stark pressure of by consent will be immeasurher in Manchuria and capable of to 9 scheme of ex-service settle-economic realities. Whether ably enhanced. The world to-ensuring its early accomplishment or "armed immigration" this condition will assist to day may not be much wiser than ment would do well to consider jas a solution, Here again is bring disarmament problems to the world of yesterday. In the ithe conditions as revealed self-deception. The long years a more satisfactory solution last year, however, many nations through the gaps in Manchurian lof Japanese domination in M: than seems just now probable, have learnt many lessons, if censorship. The reticent official history again will be able to there be any aptitude in them announcements from Tokyo, record, "ihe fact. remains tha, for learning. The chief should supplemented by disclosures (Climatic conditions are against any times during. the pasi be that, given certain condi-from recent visitors, friendly to it, added to the fact that the tie year, there have been crises tions, which bring man face the new regime, are not reassure with the homeland is a psy-which in the old days would to face with the elemental facts railway journey from Dairen to ug this time last year the chological deterrent. Desperate have involved nothing but war lof existence, the behaviour of attempts have been made, by for their breaking. Goodwill one group, of one nationality, of Harbin was as free from risk and means of personally conducted dnd the exmest desire for peace one empire is very like that of incident as could well tours, to convince civilian—recently illustrated by the another. Comparison might be demanded from a country under observers from Japan that Man-weighty deputation presented by made with the plight of an the ordered control of a big churia offers an outlet for the the Archbishop. of" Canterbury army, apparently knit by strong Jorganisation. There were signs numerous unemployed, whose to the Prime Minister of Great discipline and ordered gradation lof military activity, especially condition is gravely perplexing Beittie-have "been strongly of ranks, brought up against the between Mukden and Changchun, the Government at Tokyo. Even reinforced by economic con-grim horror of foodless, water-lof apprehension. To-day a very but the traveller was in no sort {the subservience of the Japane: siderations. Japan, beset though Tess, hopeless contact with [press has not been able entirely she be by special difficulties, desert. "The virtues and the different tale is told. Even {to conceal the doubts and dis-cannot be blind to this general failings of humanity in such a between Mukden and Dairen approval of these returned movement. On a minor scale ease are unveiled. They are elaborate defence works are be-she sees it at work in China, Balaams. The military dictators seen to belong-exclusively to no jing and have been constructed. may believe that, by coquetting where unsettlement, taking, in rank, to no class and to no: The railway between Harbin and with Russia, these and other certain areas, the form of actual nation. In this thought Manchuli kas been in throes of difficulties can be removed. civil war, is'belng" met by the should be possible to find the incessant interruption. Banditry They may be able to press precariously poised Central' Gov-Genment witha declared: policy spiritual solvent to the serious has ceased to be a local scourge, further their determination to problem with which, before demanding merely the vigilance hack their way through the of tolerance. She has undoubted-many days are passed, the com: lof that magnificent force the Manchurian problem. In the la ly been able to profit bj it in bined wisdom of the world will railway Guards. It is a military long run they will be forced to Manchuria where Russia's pre-have to wrestle at Geneva. problem on a grand scale. The ten to the wiser counsels, of ascertained only as the drama at Geneva unfolds itself, The stiffness of the task now confronting the Japanese in Manchuria cannot in the meantime be ignored. Compared with it British difficulties in South Africa thirty-two years ago were child's play,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.