The Archive · 1937

An Appeal to Reason

Nov. 5.

The appeal to reason at Brussels is made unpromising circumstances. Of the two principals in the dispute which comes under review by the signatories to the Nine Power Pact one is absent, It is unlikely therefore that the other can temper presentation of an {China and Japan' by thus assembling other! powers to consider the dispute between those two countries. The prosaic fact is that the signatories to the Nine Power Pact are bound by that engagement to engage in frank consultation with each other if any one of them considers that the situation demands consi deration of the application of the stipulations contained therein. Japan and China are both signatories, together with Belgium, Great Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United States of America. Japan herself has made certain charges against China's observance of the Treaty. It is not un= Feasonable therefore to suggest that whatever may be her justification for holding aloof from the Conference, she can hardly endorse the view that the delegates are acting ultra vires or meeting in contumely cither of Japan or China. So much is heard of the failure to keep to solemn engagements that the assemblage at Brussels chastened as its mem~ bers are by bitter experience of past disappointments does at least indicate the persistence of a determination to restore an essential part of the machinery of international relationships, M. Yvon Delbos put the matter plainly as the safeguarding of rules on which civilization depends. Japan's present resolution to have no part in the Conference seems unlikely to be modified, but it is clear that! all hope of eventually inducing her to re~ consider that decision has not been abandoned, M, Litvinoff made a good point when he warned his colleagues of the danger of subordinating fundamental issues 10 the moral satisfaction of registering personal Successes as sponsors of deliberation. Dr. Wellington Koo seems to have presented China's case with ability and exceptional restraint. "He even managed to suggest, if in the faintest outline, the possibility of meeting Japan in a spirit of compromise. Naturally he was impelled to emphasize China's view the action which has forced her Govern ment to lead the nation in resistance to Japan, but he deftly accepted Japan's own definition by disclaiming hostility to the Japanese people. That attitude docs not, of course, mean anything so long as the two are locked in a life-and-death str may be of more account when the influences of goodwill can be brought effectively to bear upon the issue confronting the Conference. Mr. Anthony Eden showed no disposition to believe that the task would be easy. He fully accepted Mr. Davis" refusal to expect miracles from the Conference, but it can at least be aid that the preliminaries have not weakened the case for perseverance. The decision to Ko into secret conclave promises a practical concentration on the search for solution rather than on the dialectical array of opposing points of view. Critics who scoff at the notion that the Conference can possibly be of value may be invited to ask themselves whether, in the light of past experience and resent heavy preoccupations, the Governments of important world-stales would expose their statesmen to a mere exercise in the frittering away of public time and money Just for the sake of making an academic flourish for the edification of intellectual theorists and their groundling dupes.

Nations, as well as men, may learn lessons: from experience. Otherwise history is a barren field of study. "That is where Brussels may hold out a signal of hope. When it is justly pointed out that the collective system built up at Geneva has badly broken down, it not so often realized that the system contains within itself the capacity for remedial action. Forcibly stating the case against the League, Mr. Douglas Jerrold in discussing] the situation here to readers of "The Nineteenth Century", says 'The present conflict arises, as so many wars: have arisen from the dawn of history, from the proximity' of a vast empire in confusion with a small, vigorous and highly organized state suffering from the pressure of population. No power on earth could ever have solved this problem by consent, No. power fon earth could ever have solved it at all without redrawing the map of Asia, and that a power which Asia will never concede to Europe, any more than Europe would concede it to Asia in regard to the frontiers of the European slates, Yet similar problems have, been settled in past times without a Mr, Jerrold argues that, owing to the terms of the Covenant, the Washington Treaty contained no provision for positive action for peace and justice or "in defence of the barest decencies of civilization." So China was sent away "contented to resume her endless civil wars. Her frontiers were secure. She could do what she liked within them". That comment is pertinent in establishing the view that the Brussels Conference cai actually make a valid contribution to the settlement of this crisis for there is nothing within the terms of the Treaty to prevent consideration just those issues to which Mr. Jerrold, albeit with an imperfect appreciation of the facts, draws timely attention. If he had studied the Lytton Report he might have corrected his history, but his emphasis on truction of the resources of two countries vitally dependent on each other's well-being is at once open to treatment.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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