To, the Editor of the "NowrH-CHina DANY News."
Sm—Let us try to make quite clear in our minds this question of a "Round Table Conference" for We want certain things undertaken which we reckon to be essential to the pence, order and security this place. May we call what we: want "A."
Japan want certain things in connection with Shanghai and their position generally in China. Let us call this "B." "B" is an unknown quantity. It is bound to overlap "A," but it may easily spread a very great deal wider, The Japanese—perfectly naturally—would like to mobilise the forces behind "A" in order to help "B." With things as they are in Manchuria they nave little hope of getting the Chinese to a bilateral discussion of their China claims and an international. conference offers the best hope.
Now comes the vital point. Great Britain and America—to take merely the two leading parties—quite definitely will "not coerce China in regard to this matter. 'They will willingly take part in a Round Table Conference (this, I think, is clear) but only if China itself' comes in of its own accord. Everything hinges, therefore, whether China will voluntarily' to enter a Round Table Conference of the sort that either we or Japan contemplate, j.e., to discuss Shanghai questions but to leave out Manchuria, The chances look, to one nat observ at least, remarkably small, If these are the broad facts, how they affect the action for Shanghai to take? Leaving ethics asi not that they should or can be left out, but for the present purpose it is unnecessary to include them—is it mot questionable tactics to make the holding of a Round Table Conference the chief feature of our What we want is to set Shanghai into the picture if and when there is an international clear-up of this whole Far Eastern mess. As to the when and the how, I cannot but think that our Governments—or be sua that it the League—are the people to and that anything like words fof advice from Shanghai would be somewhat gratuitous. The really important thing is to keep alive in the minds of the world at large that there are Shanghai problems which form an essential part of the whole situation, which area matter of world interest and without dealing with which no solution can be adequate or complete. This could be done by restating to our Governments, oF, again, to the League. the principal' dangers under which Shanghai lies and by emphasising the extent of the international interests involved.
One cannot—or one certainly /should not—ignore the psychological factor in handling questions of this rt. The recent war, which to us
Chinese something vastly more and rious incident, was to the has excited strong feelings suspicions which in the nature of things will take som down. One cannot expect a passion loss view of things from people all netted up" (our own war experiences are enough to remind us of this). China as great an Interest as ourselves in preserving the peace and trade of Shanghai but at the present moment othe prevail. Until these feelings subside and Chinese are free to feonsider the Shanghai problem on ite own merits apart from the snese tangle, to force the pace is to invite failure.
Another and last point.
An im: provement for Shanghai can, apart From military action, only come about by means of agreements with China who, though we have a huge common interest, has algo her own point of view on all political question: This is a plain fact from which there is no escape. If we recognise it'and if we shape our actions to fit it, we are bound to take into account the Chinese view and Chinese aspirations. Judge Feetham did so in making his recommendations and we shall do. well to do likewise. By. all means Jet us work out what. essential changes are called for from the foreigners' point of view and have our proposals ready. But we must also be on our guard not to seem to imply that this is the whole Jof the problem. Safeguards for Peace and security have become a more obvious need as the result of the recent war, but the war has also. emphasised the two sides of the ease: fand we cannot suppose that the Chinese will have nothing to. say' about foreign responsibility and the tueed for mutuality when it comes to making concessions. And in regard to changes in general—we must jeareful not to allow the basic Shanghai problem which the Feetham report so thoroughly analysed and dealt with to be overlaid' in our minds by possibly transient phases arising out of the war. The problem has been enlarge Jed through an international develop. ment which Judge Feetham could not foresee, Hut the of
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.