M, Litvinoff must regard the problem of the Chinese Eastern Railway in a different light from that obtaining at Nanking. Russia could indicate her readi ness to comply with the terms of the joint responsibility accepted by the Soviet and the Government of China by treating] Manchoukuo's intervention unauthorised. This would necessarily imply an ability on the] Part of China, to exercise her tights in working the Railway. No trace of that ability has been discernible for over eighteen months. Russia, therefore, cannot fairly be asked to frame policy which, in effect, means reliance on a shadow toget rid] of a substantial obstruction behind which there is an even more substantial buttress at Tokyo. In other words Russia would be asked to, risk hostilities with Japan for the maintenance of Chinese rights which China is, by the march of events however caused, unable herself effectively to de-h fend.
Russia's determination to avoid a breach with Japan_has long been clear. " It arises from appreciation of the weakness of internal position in Russia lore the failure or delayed success of the Five-Year Plan has imposed on the Soviet a dangerously critical economic strain. The, Russian war-machine is not fit to tackle the For Eastern crisis. Otherwise
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.