Mr. Neville Chamberlain has indulged in some of the straightest talking that has fallen from the lips of a British Prime Minister for some years past. He has been just as straightly spoken to by the Opposition, and as a result of the debate the latter's motion of censure has been defeated by a reasonable enough majority of 330 to 168. It is not so emphatic a defeat as supporters of the Prime Minister would undoubtedly have liked to have seen, for it is clear from the figures that there must have been over one hundred abstentions. Had these latter voted for the Opposition Mr, Chamberlain would still have carried the day, but the fact that so many members of the House of Commons failed to vote upon so momentous an issue must give rise to some anxiety, for it would undoubtedly have been better if the opinion of the whole House had been shown in the results of the division, Nevertheless the most significant portion of the debate was that portion of the Prime Minister's speech in which he posed the question:—"Do we desire to have conversations with Italy or not? If we do the sooner we have them the better." The result of the vote showed a substantial majority of the House to be of the same opinion. As has already been pointed out initial overtures to-rds this end came from Italy, and it would have been in all probability unwise to have replied with a refusal which in the circumstances could not have been anything but abrupt. It is when the Prime Minister deals with the position of Great Britain vis-a-vis of the League of Nations that some amazement must be felt. In a very fighting speech Mr. Chamberlain is downright in his iricism of the League of Nations, He has summed up what has been growing in the minds of many for a considerable time past, the opinion that the League has failed in the purpose for which it was designed. There cannot be the slightest doubt that this contention is largely true, but it should always be borne in mind that the League has achieved too much in some directions,—undoubtedly not in the main one for which it was framed,—to. permit it being dubbed a complete failure, The Prime Minister looks upon the League of Nations as designed to bring about the collective security of a number of States to prevent aggression, or, if aggression is undertaken, to stop it and punish the aggressors. "Does anybody here," he asked, "believe that the League of Nations, as it is constituted today, affords collective security for anybody?" He warned the House against deluding itself or permitting the weak nations of the world to be deluded into the belief that the League will protect them against aggression, and in doing so tore away the veil surrounding the potentialities of the League and revealed it in its inability to perform its primary function. Yet he does not propose to leave the League, because he believes that it could be reconstituted, and because it had valuable work to do, he would not tear up a single article, not even Article XVI of the Covenant in the hope that some day a reconstituted League might be able really to use the powers and functions which it had originally been given. That is a very plain statement that events have proved the League to have lost much of its virtue, that in some aspects of international polities it has no longer the potency which it was hoped it would have, and that, making the best of a bad bargain, it is better to look these facts in the face and realize what they mean. It has proved itself unable to enforce sanctions because of the impossibility of securing complete unanimity amongst member states, and it is obvious that the Prime Minister considers a Covenant which has no teeth in it is to a great extent worthless. The difference between Mr. Chamberlain and his former Foreign Secretary is an important one. The latter presented to the aggressor nations an inflexible opposition calculated to increase their irritation: Mr. Chamberlain desires to follow a policy which will seek to explore every means of European appeasement. He does not intend to depart from the principles of the League, but within its framework desires to discover how much agreement can be reached with Italy. It is clear that, if Italy insists upon recognition of its empire in Abyssinia as an essential preliminary, the proposed conversations must fail so long as the League persists in its present attitude on that subject. It has recently been shown that the Scandinavian countries are uneasy about that fact, and may seek to change the League's point of view.
There will be many who will argue that, if in order to maintain its existence the League has to make a sacrifice of principle such as this, it does not deserve to continue. It is a perfectly good argument, but if in its existence it fails of the main purpose for which it was conceived, fails to secure that collective security but contributes to collective insecurity, there will be many who will argue that the sooner it is ended the better. That is not Mr. Chamberlain's view. He has definitely asserted his belief in the merits, or possible merits of the League, but makes it perfectly plain that, unless they can be practically demonstrated to the satisfaction of himself and his Cabinet, he and they must take such steps as will afford the British Empire the greatest possible protection having in view the realities of the world situation. That the Prime Minister's pronouncement will bring dismay to the hearts of the supporters, and believers in the ultimate efficacy of the League is not to be doubted. It is one of the most striking announcements that have been made for many years past. That it will create an enormous amount of controversy seems to be inevitable, but it seems that the time had come for these things to be said. They make bitter reading, but necessary. On the other hand they place the matter fairly and squarely before the Italian Government. The Prime Minister in effect says he realizes wherein the League fails, he is still loyal to' its principles, but is prepared to face the realities of the situation, always bearing in mind that loyalty. There can, therefore, be no doubt as to the British policy which has now been enunciated. It does not necessarily mean that there has been any substantial change in it, though it may be inferred that it will not now be applied with quite the same rigidity as has been the case in the past.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.