Aug. 8.
The report published ye: day to the effect that the British Admiralty were planning substantial additions to the Navy, including the building of several mew cruisers, destroyers and submarines, is' significant because of the comment attached to the report by the news agency conveying it. The report continues:—"The plan, however, does Rot contemplate the completion lof this building programme before 1936, hence the addition is entirely "outside the London Naval Treaty which expires in that year. It is interpreted as a. sequel to the building programmes of the United States land Japan. While both the: nations will remain well wil something of a change regarding armament It is an interesting affairs when the advances which were being made towards disarmament have to be nullified by naval building pro-Jxrammes of other countries whom it can also be rightly said that naval competition is not necessarily the essential object view. Japan has embarked jon_an extensive building programme, which, it is conceded by the United States, amounts to the replacing of ' worn out vessels, and not_much more When completed the Japane: will have done no more than. is allowed under the London Treaty. The United States have embarked upon the construction of 32 new vessels in addition to the 17 at present under construc. tion. "The additional scheme presents an expenditure approximately $240,000,000 while a further $75,000,000 may spent in the modernization of existing vessels. But while the programmes of neither the United States nor of, Japan will bring those coun-3 up to the levels estadlisl ed by London Naval Conference, clear thi unless Great Britain extends her own building ideas the di the naval forces of parity between the naval forces of Britain and the other countries would be impressively greater than it is at present. For it she really was not called upon to do, save as an earnest of her desire for a considerable reduc-Mien, jin the naval forces of the wor Xt is stated that if ships commission alone are considered 'Japan exceeds either the United States and Great Britain in numbers, and that the United States comes third in the list. But. while ships in commission may' not prove a very good test of ultimate strength, it may prove evaluable index to the degree of preparedness for an imminent war. As a result of the London Naval Conference of 1980 the following strengths were arrived '(tonnage) 146,000 180,000 108,400 eric gun trainers ctonsege) "199,000 149,500 100,49 trovers (fonnsge) 150,000 150,000 105,600
(Tonnage) 62,700 62,700 62,700
Total tonnage 541,700 26200 967,05
The above amounts to the ratio agreed upon at the London conference of Great Britain 10, United States 9.8, and Japan though if the number of ships in commission is accepted as a criterion the present' ration appear tobe Japan 10," Sreat Britain' 8.5. United States 6S. A large number of ships in the'
jes of each country have reached the age limit for warlike. service as laid down in the. London agreement as Thus of Great Britain's cruisers sixteen cruisers, all of the "C" class, are out of data, the Comus having been built m 1914, and all. the rest no. later than 1917, so that effectives in this classification under the agreement amount to no. more than 36. It might be thought (hat so large a drop in effectives has reduced the British navy manner calculated to arouse the gravest anxiety amongst those who attach so much to the importance of Britain m ing her strength. Na have been greatly perturbed at the-lack of margin of po Which reductions in recent years have created, and there "have recently been some vers outspoken remarks on the subject by senior naval officers, But British policy' was dominated by two important, factors:—firstl the necessity for giving an im: posing lead in the matter of disarmament, and, secondly, the desire to avoid the large expenditure which replacements and building to the new ratio would have entailed. It would appear that Britain ix being Forced by circumstances come pletely outside her control to adopt a new policy. with regard to her navy which will not be welcomed with regret by" the many who have watched developments in recent years with no little disquietude, All this does not at the present time constitute a further race in naval construction. Both the United States and Japan ar agreed between themselves that they ure not in competition with regard to naval strength: Great Britain is most certainly not, though she will have to look Jatter her own interests. What is being done at the "present moment is that exch country is mating sure that when the end lof 1936 is reached each will have built up to the agreed ratio and will be ready to sail across the starting point on the best of, the existing agreed terms. ° The hope that there would be little or no naval building: during the period 1990-1936 has definitely to discarded, By the end of that term it appears extremely likely that full advantage of the terms of the agreement will have ery party thereto, and it is then, if at all, that the naval race will begin. Tt seems obvious that if in 1986 Japan is not conceded that naval equality which she has repeatedly demanded, she will proceed to assume it. If the other countries continue in denial they will have to build in proportion. to maintain that slight—extra amount of strength which they have at present. They are able to do that, and even more, but as these naval developments arise it becomes increasingly clear that Japan, if she is to continue in her present policies, will set the temp after the conclusion of. the London agreement. It is a short-sighted argument to allege that much benefit to the employment situation in a count arises from increased naval construction. That for the time being it does tend towards the rapid circulation of money and thereby act as 'a temporary palliative of existing: evils. may be true, but it cannot be believed to be anything else, unless, agree ments going by the board, the countries of the world are again foreed into extensive armament expenditure for the purpose of what amounts to the insurance of a national existence. If euch a situation does arise at the end of 1936 the peace of the world will last just as long. as no particular country feels able to take fon all-comers, and then history will be given. another tragic chance of repeating itself
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.