April 17.
Mr. Wang Ching-wei's statement to the Press on Saturday broke no fresh ground. He confirmed the view that negotiations between China and Japan could not be attempted at the moment. He supported the idea of resi tance in the North and his present limitation of China's diplomatic action consists in relying on the League of Nations to operate as the result of the formation of the Advisory Committee which adjourned on March 28 without fixing a date of reassembly. He discerned in Japan the germ of dissatisfaction with the present Japanese policy. He hoped that something would come of the conferences shortly to take place in China between various Sections of political opinion, He laid stress on the need for national unity. He did not pretend to expect military success in the field but maintained that th duty of resisting, even at the risk of incurring much suffering, was placed upon the people of x China. He recognised that little (progress in the military sense had been made in the North but} insisted that all available sources, "however inadequate,' should be utilised to carry out a policy of resistance. In sum this "attitude, reflecting presumably does the Government's reading of the situation, is hesitant. It goes halfway to face facts and then goes halfway into the realm of make believe, First of all encouragement the notion that, Japanese policy in Manchuria has aroused the opposition of any appreciable ection, of publ fon in jo opin Japan is highly misleading. If, the plans of the Chinese Government are based on such an ex.
pectation they are doomed to disappointment, The resignation of Mr. K, Takahi Finance Minister and pillar the of Cabinet, has been forecasted with some degree of confidence. It would undoubtedly be a blow to the Saito administration but reconstruction would follow. Continued regard of Manchukuo as a cardinal point in Japanese foreign policy, to quote Mr. Yoshizawa's recent statement to this journal, is certain to mark the Japanese Government and Popular support of it for some time to come.
Mr. Wang Ching-wei is ap. parently satisfied that there is no essential difference between tical Jeaders over anese issue. Yet it would, to the detached observer, be easier to discern the process of disintegration in recent events, in China than to imagine any emergence of popular Japanese! sentiment against the direction of General Arak's forceful Policy. in Manchuria Bilthely, Mr. Wang Ching-wel. talks of utilising "resources in a cam-Paign of resistance. What there to r Japan does not want to come beyond the Great Wall. The danger, in the eyes of Tokyo, is that the concentration of Chinese troops Chinese territory on this side of the Wall may make it dificult for the Japanese General Staff to avoid extending its commit. ments, The recapture of Jehol by Chinese military forces is of the question. The campaign of "resistance" resolves itself therefore into a gratuitous! enticement of Japanese troops to further seizure of Chinese soil. Expenditure from Government funds on such a campaign is simply an act of. unthinking, prodigality. Even assuming that, by the lavish outpouring of money, the troops now loosely' scattered in Chihli could be swiftly organised into a coherent, well-equipped, well-stained and efficient fighting machine, does anyone suppose that the Japanese would stand patiently on guard on the Wali, academically interested in the metamorphosis? lin point of fact the funds are not sufficient even to begin such jan attempt. To proceed further, the Government has not at its disposal a large enough staff competent military officers for so portentous a feat. If anyone could tackle it, it would be General Chiang Kai-shek but he has shown a strange disinclina-{tion to endorse such a flattering estimate of his powers. If he were a superman he could hardly be expected to galvanised into effective activity troops of which his Finance Minister gave ]80 doleful a. description a few }weeks ago, He knows what the Communists in Kiangsi demand jof him. He knows how dangerous it is to let them regain the ascendancy. He dealing with a problem well within his limitations in direeting recovery of the ground gained by the Red Armies during his absence in the North. He has already met with some success. He is not likely to countenance diversion of military funds to the North when effective use of them can be made in reclaiming {territory within Nanking's immediate purview.
It is possible that this general line of thought may present itself to tr. Wang Ching-wel when the returns to Nanking. It must reinforced by consideration lof the hard facts of the financial position. Instead of relying on the Advisory Committee of th League to. embark on empirical adventures of Arti 1, to which every responsible nation member of the League has shown anxious diffidence, it might be more practical for the Chinese Government to invite! definite guidance from Geneva jon the course which. it should pursue. The suggestion that! direct negotiations with Japan ave impossible just now may be sound. The idea—mooted in some quarters—that it has to be rejected out of deference to the League is unsound. To carry the matter to the extreme point lof assuming that such negoti tions might involve the recognition by China of the status of Manchukuo, it would not neces sarily imply that the League would grieve. Not that negotiation would certainly involve s0 specific a cession of China's ease; it is more than probable that, once negotiations were seriously in train, the spirit of compromise would effectively] Jeliminate too distasteful asperities. Yet the point is good: the League would welcome some kind of Sino-Japanese understanding in suspension of the present highly dangerous and armful state of semi-hostilities. There would be little disposition to stand upon the letter of the League's relations with the two arties. Indeed the way would cleaver for application of that part of the Lytton scheme which provides for the active assistance lof the League in restoring the shattered fabric of China and, consequently, the morale of the [Central Government, whether it be as. now constituted or reorganised on a broader basis of political authority. There seems to be in Nanking some vaguely-defined dread of a vaguely-defined popular agitation against composition with Japan. this feeling really exist? El ments from which it might be expected to emerge are apparently oppressed by a sense of the utter failure of the Government, to provide adequate resistance whatever Japanese action is determined in the North. 'The present hesitant, policy evokes no enthusiasm. Were it chang-into a flamboyant flourish of fiance it would swiftly wreck its authors' reputation by the mere disillusionment which would naturally follow. Is not possible that a courageous lendotsement of Mr. T. V. Soong's criticism of China's military resources, coupled with the-same Minister's acute perception of the desperate financial needs of the country, would assist in commending a really definite abandonment of the present. policy of negotiation? Thence might be evolved a dignified method of approach toward Japan, Tt would not be less dignified because it admitted the weakness of China's material position. Tt would, indeed, be worthy of the highest respect, for it would-have, for its main
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.