Apr. 19.
Mr, Aviyoshi comes back from Japan with, it is said, the clear conviction that the time is still not ripe for diplomatic discussions of the Northern situa tion with China. There is consequently agreement between Tokyo and Nanking on. that point, The Japanese view is based on consideration of the uncertainty of the political sit tion in China. "The Chinese view ig less simple to define. Merchants and' bankers would be only too glad to see a settlement and an end of the indeterminate state of war that is not war with all its disturbing effects on conditions everywhere, In the North itself a composition with Japan would probably bring relief. In Nanking the wisdom of such a move has long been discerned but an uneasy awe of public opinion induces a stern suppression of signs of the pos~ sion of that wisdom, Canton is busily engaged in fathering inaccurate announcements of negotiations alleged to be in train and in violently advocating a resistance to which it actually contributes neither men nor money. Meanwhile, in contemplating the attitude of the Japanese High Command, Chinese critics appear to overlook the significance of their chief and perfectly correct contention that military control of Japanese policy has' been long in the ascendant, Accepting the sincerity of Tokyo's desire to confine rations to the North of the vat Wall, there can be little doubt that, if the Japanese General Staff were amenable to the directions of a civil administration, the overwhelming: military superiority at Japan's disposal would be able to secure the territorial integrity of Manchoukuo (with Jehol) in complete disregard of the ill-organised vagueness embodied in the sprawling units under Chinese command in Chihli, But the whole situation is viewed and dealt with from the purely mili-
mind which, unconcerned with tary, standpoint by a military Political anxieties, merely sees that, in response' to a" quasi-military challenge, definite military measures have to be token. 'Therefore the tendency to advance rather than to. consolidate is bound to be dominant. While the Japanese High Command may be genuinely reluctant to face extension of its commitments, say, to Peking or, per-further, it lacks' the ation of effective civil control of, policy which alone can modify the influence of text-book prescriptions.
That is why the Chinese armies, ill-fitted though they be for serious military action, are unwittingly, as it were, Tung the Japanese forces on into China proper. If this could be eventually followed up by a rallying of vast numbers of troops capable of cutting off the invaders there might be something to be said for this involuntary strategy but, notoriously, such possibilities can brought within the purview of the wildest dreams of Chinese authority. The Government of China cannot have it both ways; it cannot rest on. the argument that Japan is dominated by her Minister of War who direct: aggressive policy as a soldier and not as a diplomat and then expect that its own brandishment of military force will be treated on other than purely military lines. That fallacy vitiates the argument that resist tance, even if admittedly in the material sense, is tle only line of conduct to be. observed by-China in this crisis. Such resistance is equivalent' to the folly of the gambler who pits his Jéefinitely limited store of money fagainst_a bank equipped with vast resources. Tt is like the jection of the ill-instructed punter who puts his last ten-dollar note on a non-starter and expects, against all the laws of prosaic racing fact, to recoup himself for his losses thereby. And the Chinese Government li gambling not with its own money but with the welfare and conjtentment of the people of this country, to say nothing of its lown political reputation. Japanese reluctance to get into contact with the Chinese Government is Jdue, in the main, to the convietion that any effort of that kind would be interpreted as a weakening of Tokyo's will and would therefore encourage false hopes in Nanking. It may, of course, be suggested that Japan is also inclined to allow matters ito drift until approach comes from the Chinese side in a desperate spirit of subservient pheal, ready to accept the most stringent conditions as a price of settlement. There is all the more reason for Chinese leaders to forestall that expectation by prompt initiative in making contact. There can be little doubt that a move of that kind could be made without loss of dignity and would be treated by Japan with courteous consideration if not magnanimity.
China's difficulties are, un: happily, not those of Japan's sole making. Let it be assumed, for a moment, that the Govern. ment at Nanking is convinced lof the need for contact and acted on that belief. Immediately it would be assailed by the bitter criticism of its domestic opponents. The technique of political manwuvring demands, apparently, much public assertion of the need for resistance to the death" from sections of Jopinion which have not the slightest intention of participate ing in such an epic. Yet is the Government to permit itself, to exhaust the patience of the general public by acquiescing in tragic pageant of mock-resistance, merely because adoption lof the more sensible course of immediately facing facts, which have to be faced sooner or later, will loosen the vitriolic tongues amiable dilettantes in Shanghai, Hongkong, Canton and Ka gan? Vocal public opinion here may be a glutton for fantasy but fantasy surely is an unsubstantial form of diet in the present crisis. The Government has been lately exhorted to tell the people the truth. The diatribes of the advocates of resistance have, during the last few months, been shorn of all claim to relation with facts. Conferences to which leaders of all sections of opinion are invited are about to be held. From time to time leaders of the Government have not been afraid to reveal part of the truth. Mr. T. V. Soong unveiled the feebleness of the military machine. Mr. Wang Ching-wei has, by implication, [disclaimed belief in the effectiveness of resistartce. Mr. Sun Fo has boldly declared that the situation in Kiangsi will demand General Chiang Kai-shek's concentrated personal attention for some time to come. General Chiang Kai-shek's actions have long. supplied comment which his silence has fortified. Let the Government, in consultation with the accredited representatives of China's commerce and finance, come out with the whole truth for which it, in its collective entity, will take full responsibility. It might then Ihave the support of such a mass lof the real public in China that the empty mutterings of its bel opponents would go unheeded and scorned. It might even go perhaps to the extent of making its announcement of the truth {the preliminary to an invitation to its opponents to offer their solution and, of course, as a necessary consequence to assume definite responsibility for putting it into elect. Better still, while agreeing to allow internal differences in policy to stand for future discussion, it might hold Jout the hand of' readiness to associate all sections of opinion ju the single task of making contact with Japan. Unless some action of this kind can be taken, the calamitous drift in the North will not be stayed.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.