Mr. de Valera's statement, in an interview given to the London "Evening Standard," on the subject of the partition of Ireland adds nothing to the controversy, though it does serve to present it in a somewhat new light. The fact that the six Ulster counties remain obdurate in their refusal to be united with the Free State has always been a sore point with the Irish leader, though successive British Governments have made it quite clear that the whole question must be settled between the governments of the two portions of Ireland. The idea of arranging the issue by means of a plebiscite has been abandoned by the Free State Premier, even though he claims that by it his government would enlarge the territory under its control, and while he suggests that Ulster might be given autonomy in local affairs, with guarantees for the National minority in that area, the fact is that he is refusing that right of self-determination to the Ulsterman which he has claimed and obtained for the rest of Ireland. To claim that the English are morally responsible for the existence of the division verges on absurdity, for it must surely follow that if-the- doctrine of self-determination is to be granted to one section of Ireland it should be granted to the other. It is a historical fact that the present division is none of England's making. Ulster decided that it would remain loyal to the United Kingdom, and refused to follow the Irish Free State in separation. It was a matter in which those who preferred to remain faithful to the old order of things had complete freedom of choice, and the attitude.of the British Government is that so long as they insist on their own freedom from the Irish Free State no action will be taken by Whitehall to force them to alter their choice. It is the only logical development of the position, and so long as the British Government refrains from interference in the matter and leaves Ulster to makeup its own mind that degree of justice will be done which the situation demands. There should be no question of any British coercion on a subject upon which Northern Ireland is fully capable of making up its own mind.
But Mr. de Valera places the whole matter in a sinister light when he warns England that the chances of Eire's ce-operation with Great Britain in the event of a European war are slight so long as the partition remains. It is the duty of statesmen to take advantage of every situation as opportunity occurs, and it is obvious that he looks towards the pressure of other European events to force the hand of Great Britain in making the required concession in its own defence. If the Union is at such a low ebb that it is necessary to purchase the assistance of the Irish Free State at the cost of a grave injustice to Northern Ireland, then it seems to be hardly worth defending. ' If the moral questions involved àre capable of settlement on such a poor basis they are no longer moral nor even questions. Real morality demands as much freedom for Northern Ireland as Mr. de Valera so persistently claims for that portion of the island under his leadership. Of that there can be no gainsaying, for if the British control of Ireland in the past was so iniquitous from the point of view of principle, then, obviously the transfer of Northern Ireland to a control for which it has not the slightest use would be just as grave an injustice. Not only that, it is a wholly unacceptable contention that a section of Ireland which has remained faithful to the Union, and refused to follow the path selected by Mr. de Valera and.his followers, should in fact be forced to secede and become a minority under a government in which its people do not trust. The division is none of England's making: it was not England which tore Northern Ireland from the Free State, but Northern Ireland which refused to leave the Union.
That contention is reinforced by Lord Craigavon's reply to Mr. de Valera "During the years I have been in office, I have seen no signs of change in the sentiment of Northern Ireland,—indeed, the loyalty and affection of the people of Northern Ireland towards the British Crown are stronger today than at any time in her history. Therefore, Mr. de Valera can cease using Northern Ireland as a weapon to threaten the Government at Whitehall. I can only reiterate the old battle cry of Northern Ireland: No surrender.
Mr. de Valera has no charge to make against Whitehall that Northern Ireland is in any way being oppressed, and that his demands are inspired by a desire to protect people of his own nationality. So far from that, the majority in the north favour a continuance of the existing arrangement, and, what is more, are definitely opposed to any change in their status such as Mr. de Valera desires. Because he wants it so, is no reason. why his wish should be gratified, and the loyalty of Northern Ireland must be reciprocated by the rest of the Union. That loyalty, however, also requires that if at any time it did desire union with the Free State it should be granted. That is most definitely the attitude adopted by the British Government, and the question of union or disunion in Ireland is one for the North to decide solely by itself. There will certainly be no British influence used either one way or the other. The threat implied in Mr. de Valera's statement must be taken for what it is worth. Undoubtedly with a section of Ireland not wholeheartedly committed to the defence of the Union, the position of the latter would to some extent be weakened. It would be tragically so if by any chance the Free State, in the event of War, abandoned that neutrality which is to be expected of it, but it is better that that risk should be faced, than that Whitehall should be dragooned into an abandonment of Northern Ireland in the manner which Mr, de Valera apparently contemplates. Fortunately the chances of his success are small. Great Britain is not likely to be intimidated by any such warning, and at the moment it does not appear that any useful contribution has been made to the consideration of the problem involved by Mr. de Valera's latest statement. With the issue left as it is between the two divisions of Ireland for settlement between themselves it is obviously the better course for the Irish Free State to persuade Northern Ireland of the benefits of absorption than to seek for a forced union in which Whitehall as definitely committed itself not to assist,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.