Last week the sino-Japenese sragdle 1
entered Into what may prove to be its most! significant phase. Though the extension of; Japanese operations into south China was long expected, the landing in Blas Bay had about it elements of surprise, and it easily to be understood that the news of this development created some consternation in Hankow. Looking back it would seem that, had the Japanese command decided upon this move some months back, the prolonged struggle for Hankow might have been considerably shortened, and indeed the whole feampaign might have' followed entirely different lines after the fall of Kiukiang. [Reasons for the delay are numerous, but the most probable one is that General Ugaki's policy as Foreign Minister sought to avoid fany movement which might worsen relations between his country and Great Britain. This seems to be supported by the statements made at the time of his resignation that the Japanese Government would pursue a stronger policy all round, and the fact that] the descent on the South' did not take place until after his relinquishment of office certainly gives that theory much colour. There is another one to the effect that the Japanese held their hand hoping that the southern leaders would drop their allegiance to the Chinese Government, and declare their independence. Indeed it is reported that in trigues to that end were being actively fostered, and it was only when it was realized that this alternative to actual invasion was not likely to be brought about that the Sapanese decided upon this further extension of their military commitments. 'The fact that] up to the present the Chinese appear to have offered no very great resistance is quite understandable. 'The low-lying terrain. is unsuitable for' defence, while the Chinese would obviously not.seek to make a stand at Jany point within reach of the Japanese naval Jguns. The Japanese were able consequently to effect a quick landing and progress inland with the result that the capture of the important point of Waichow was only a matter lof a very few days.
Sudging from the evidence available it is apparent that the immediate objective of the Japanese command is to secure command of the Canton-Kowlooa Railway and the Canton, River, for the purpose of preventing supplies from abroad reaching the interior. Success! will not completely cut the Chinese govern~ ment off {rom the outside world, but the other routes by which supplies can reach it are so long and diMeult that the closing of this channel will undoubtedly prove a serious blow to the Chinese armies. It is an objective which should not prove difficult of attain ment. The progress which the Japanese have already made brings them within striking distance of the railway, and, unless the Chin ese can put up sterner opposition than they appear to have done up to the present, de~ finite control of the line should not prove ificult, nor take very long. With the Chinese! closing the Canton River against the menace of the Japanese naval vessels Canton will be practically cut off from the world, though it may be possible for some supplies to enter by means of the intricate network of water~ ways in the Canton delta the complete stoppage of which would be a task of some magnitude. They would, however, represent only a small fraction of the original influx, 30 that for all practical purposes command the railway and of the river should serve the immediate desire of the Japanese com= mand. If there is any great merit in the suggestion that they have been awaiting the secession of the South from the Chinese Gov-_ ernment they may then prefer to hold their liliand, instead of marching on Canton which would obviously require a much stronger force than they have at present thrown into Wich the Chinese can muster is sufficiently wat area. On the other hand if the strength
imposing to imperil the Japanese forees on the spot, Japan might be obliged to send reinforcements, so that in either event' they might find themselves more deeply involved than they appear to be at the moment.
Elsewhere developments are slow. The reports of a substantial Chinese victory just appropriately prior to October 10 have not been persisted in, They have been emphatically denied by the Japanese, and at the very most it would seem that some small local success has been subjected to a process of enthusiastic magnification. Nevertheless, it does seem to be certain that even now, south of the Yangtze, the, Tapa {he comparatively small advance since the icularly easy.
fall of Kiukiang the diMculties they have been encountering in overcoming the Chinese resistance must be impressive. There is every likelihood that they will have to do a great deal more severe fighting before they succeed in cutting the Canton-Hankow Railway at Sienning, which at one time seemed to be their objective. With command of the approaches to Canton, however, that railway station does not now appear to be so im= mediately desirable, though a sufficient advance in that direction should apply such pressure upon the Chinese that they may be obliged to abandon the whole position south of the river. Very much the same situation prevails north of the Yangtze. Along. the river banks, on the direct route to Hankow, the Japanese appear to be making little headway, but with the advance which has been made in Honan, including the cutting of the Peiping-Hankow Railway, it may very well be that the Japanese do not care to press too hard along the river in a movement which might prove quite expensive. Indeed the whole situation in Hupeh and southern Honan depends chiefly upon the progress the Japanese can make down the railway from Sinyang, and unless the Chinese can.hold them up, the indications are that the pincer-like effect of their advances may induce the Chinese ultimately to withdraw from a salient which {s daily becoming more precarious. Naturally the fate of Hankow in such circumstances must give rise to considerable anxiety. If as] it has been reported the Chinese intend to defend the Wuhan cities, and the defence works which have been prepared in them suggest the correctness of that view, then there is the gravest danger that this portant centre will be reduced to ruin, as have been so many other cities. If on' the other hand the Chinese command decide to extricate their forces intact with the idea of fighting another day, there may still be a chance that the Wuhan cities will escape that destruction which otherwise seems inevit-~ able.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.