Sept. 21.
Having stated its opinion.¢t the [Cantonese manifesto to_members lof the Kuomintang—which is that it contains no point worthy of a true stateman's second thoughts—this journal is reluctant to be drawn into any controversy over the matter. The rebuttal of the Jstatements made in these columns jin the perhaps somewhat perfervid letters of Mr. John U. Lee, contain accusations which need examination before they can be allowed to pass. The charges of unfairness for ought by Mr. Lee have already Jocen adequately dealt with. This journal published its comment jupon the manifesto at the same time that it published the manifesto, and the public itself is the Joost judge of whether the comment was or was not justified. In his second letter, however, Mr. Lee shows that he has completely miss-Jed the point of the comment. He understands its meaning, but he Jeannot perceive why it has been made. He resents the statement that, judging from the contents of the Mmanifesto, the politicians who issued it—for this paper presumes to doubt the wholeheartedness of the military commanders whose Jnames were appended—seemed to place the interests of the Kuomintang above the welfare of the nation. Tt may, of course, be argued that, so long as the period of tutelage exists, the interests of the /Kuomintang are the interests of the nation. But in that case it must be regretted that, since a house divided against itself cannot stand, the country is in a very parlous Jcondition. "In the present state of affairs within and without China, most observers agree that the first essential is a national willingness for prolonged and sustained effort Jat reconstruction: on the one side because chaotic administration, foanditry, and communism are an internal haemorrhage which must be stopped before the resources of the country are completely drain-;_and on the other, because the menace of external aggression, now marrowed down in scope to one or two powers, is as grave as it has lever been in the history of the With these two points in mind—land the manifesto of the Cantonese Jappears to agree that they are the two most important—It is possible analyse the document in ques~ ition. An indictment of the administration in Nanking is based upon what? Firstly, upon the fact that certain resolutions which were Jadopted at the Fourth National Congress of the Kuomintang, more remarkable for their popular Jpeal than for their relation to actual probabilities, have not been jearried out. In 'a previous comment it was emphasized that the carrying out of these resolutions would have been suicidal. It was then affirmed, in the belief that tenerals who signed the manifesto Jwere competent to hold their posts, jas they have proved themselves 10 in the past, that no one could know better than they the futility Jof what is tantamount to declaring war upon Japan with China's present military efficiency in the de-Jplorable state it is. This is written in no spirit of reflection upon the patriotism of those thousands of Chinese who would willingly lay down their lives in such a con-ict; but pat alone, without military training, without the money to buy' patriots food and Jammunition or even furnish them with the wherewithal to withstand the weather, cannot go far against highly efficient and modern Jequipped army. The best blood of the nation would be poured out as jit it were water. And why? Because a resolution passed by a Kuomintang Congress when the circumstances were altogether different—or rather, the significance lof the circumstances had not been fully comprehended—could not be Jcarried out when those responsible for doing so found themselves facting hard and unpleasant facts.
All this, however, does not explain as clearly as is possible the doubt which the impartial observer must feel over the motives of those who issued the manifesto, There is nothing shameful in locating resistance to the death, provided the advocate is prepared stand in the forefront of the seattle. Nothing but sympathy can lbe felt with such sentiments, {tong as, when they become nation jai or even party policies, the in-Jauence of the heart is tempered by that of the head. Has that been the case with the issuers of the Jmanifesto? It would be presumpjtuous to answer that question in the general. Many of the signator-fies of the manifesto have otherwise good records in national administration. But the point at Issue is the manifesto, and so far as that is concerned, the evidence Jwould seem to be overwhelming
tion inevitable because a by-gone conference decreed certain ac~ tions?' The answer has already been indicated. But beside that, the manifesto is in itself contradic tory. In the same breath it advo-Jeates active resistance to Japan Jand productive reconstruction. Are these two things possible at the same time? An attempt to reclaim ithe lost Three Eastern Provinces would mean war with Japan by terms of the Manchoukuo protocol celebrated this week. In the event lof war, what national resources }would "be left for reconstruction?
JCanton itself has embarked upon a very extensive scheme of industrialization and improvements, demanding the expenditure of huge Jsums of money. Nanking is launching upon even more extensive plans. In both areas the plans fare designed to increase the wealth Jof the country and its powers of production—both admittedly sadly Inceessary in the present condition Jof affairs. How long could these Jambitious plans stand up while the nation was straining itself to the utmost to fight a more power~ ful enemy? There seems no reason to elaborate further upon the point; but it must be repeated that nobody of competent men, to Jwhom these arguments must appear elementary, "could outline contradictory @ design for the immediate future without together keeping their tongues out of their cheeks. And at this juncture that alone is suff-Jcient to cause their motives to be suspect.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.