Nov. 16.
The Government's success in dis~ lodging the Red forces from certain parts of Kiangsi marks a de~ finite Stage in a campaign which General Chiang Kai-shek has been personally directing for several months. Despatches appearing in these columns have endeavoured to dissipate the notion that the Generalissimo can afford to rest on his oars, He himself does not harbour any such thought, if re~ ports are correct. Yet there is a distinct danger in undue com~ placency among those from whom he is entitled to demand sustained support and encouragement. To the solution of the Communist problem General Chiang Kai-shek has brought two principles of fundamental importance. He has endeavoured to reorganize his troops on efficient lines. He has recognized the necessity for following up military successes with proper schemes of administration. He would be the frst to declare that unless these cardinal points policy can have their full weight, the successes hitherto recorded by the Government armies amount to nothing more than ploughing the nds. In the reclaimed area of uth Kiangsi,, the Generalissimo initiated far-reaching plans of reconstruction. It is claimed that those areas now are experiencing the best system of government known to them since the Revolution. Personal ascendancy, possessing many of the attributes of dictatorship, has been mainly responsible for the progress thus far achieved. It is well to consider how rapidly the task can be pressed to its logical conclusion. The reorganization of an army is a formidable problem. The reorg ganization of a provincial government may be an even more diffi= cult feat. In conditions as they exist in China, it connotes virtually the creation of completely new machinery and the inspiration of a new spirit to keep it in motion. General Chiang Kai-shek's manner of handling this reconstruction has been outlined in special despatches lately published in this journal. Continuance of the beneficent work must depend on the General-{ssimo's ability to. maintain the physical and mental vigour commensurate with the responsibilities assumed and, on his own. single minded determination to act in the interests of the country. That this involves action which fearlessly assumes dictatorial powers, in fact if not in name, must be apparent to anyone who realizes the obsstructions and obstacles barring the way. Yet looking at the altern: tive to a clear-cut, resolute policy, there can hardly be any hesitation in making a choice, Successful though recent drives in Kiangsi have been, they have resulted in sweeping the Reds from that province into others. Pukien is earmarked for a Communist campaign. It should be earmarked for an early extension of the Kiangsi reconstruction tech unique. The Canton forees which have been engaged for the past year in keeping the Kiangsi Reds away from Fuangtung, have, Their morale has been steadily raised and their leadership consequently developed with resultant improvement of the fighting capacity of their men. In other words General Chiang Kai-shek has been able to insist that the function of an army is to fight to the death. This has opposed to the Communists the relentless spirit which hitherto had been their exclusive asset. It has inevitably resulted in hea casualty lists. Consequently General Chiang Kai-shek, in pressing the campaign further afield, has had to draw on reinforcements which have been partly supplied from the North. Like commanders in other countries, General Chiang Kai-shek is well' aware that all troops are not of the same stamina, His admittedly sweeping reform: may not have been as effective with some units as with others.
Old traditions die hard. At same time the establishment of a definite moral superiority in Kiangsi is a clear achievement. It gives promise of equally satisfactory results when the time comes to: inoculate Fukien with the serum.
What of the situation in Szechuan? A year ago a Chengtu Jdespatch, in recording General Liu Hsiang's successes against the Reds, expressed the view that the action. was belated. The Reds had been firmly embedded in important parts of the Province. This, unfortunately, seems to have been a correct appraisal. Efforts were valiantly made to prevent the junction of Ho Lung's depleted forces with those of the other Red leaders, the chief of whom was Hsu Hsiang-chen. Now it would seem that Hsu has consolidated his position and Found him, as the weeks go by, the concentration of Communist armies seems likely to develop. The capture of Juikin in Kiangsi has Fendered the precarious the former "capital" of the so-called Soviet Government of China, It seems probable that with the eventual filtration of the defeated Kiangsi Reds into Szechuan, the story of Juikin may be repeated in T'onj kiang, where last year the "Szechuan-Shensi Provincial Sov-fet" was duly established under the command of Hsu Hsiang-chen. The Chinese Government is, therefore, likely to be faced with an exceedingly stubborn problem in Szechuan. The province, heavily taxed for several decades ahead, distraught by the ravages of sense~ ess civil wars of long duration, is an easy prey to Communist propaganda, although the Reds have effectively prevented any willing adherence to their ranks by the extreme ferocity of their excess Any control which they may hol in Szechuan will be based on terrorism and complete lack of faith in the existence of any! power sufficiently strong to break obvious that General Chiang Kai-shek will require all his fortitude, his proved tenacity, his leadership and his organizing jus to keep the ground gained in Kiangsi and to mobilize resources adequate for the reclamation of Fukien and Szechuan, He is fortunate in commanding the confidence of his immediate col-Teagues. He has earned esteem by his recent tours in the North. Can he also rely on securing that idea and not less important means of encouragement—the inspiration of a real expression of patriotism in the best sense of the term? This implies appreciation of the need for justifying the government to the people, not by pronouncements or admonitions but by remedial measures to cope with the prevalent economic and administrative JAnglo-Japanese Alliance, has. as would be expected, been' promptly denied on Monday. Whether the authors of the rumour were more concerned to discredit Sir John Simon than to further the cause of international concord is a matter Jof conjecture. Perhaps genuine jmisinterpretation of the curious tendencies, lately noticed in these columns and castigated by the "Economist" and the "Observer", may have inspired the story which, Reuter now reports, is officially denied with the crushing remark that it is "unworthy of comment". There is no reason to believe that an agreement regarding the naval issue is beyond the power of the three nations who have been in Jconference in London. Mr. Matsu-Jdaira's position is difficult, owing to the constitutional freedom of the Navy spokesmen at Tokyo to utter caveats at any moment con-In other words the British compromise to which the Japanese Naval authorities were reported to have made such uncompromising objections, still holds the field. In Tokyo' there are influences which counsel consideration of it. Counter-influences are deerly at work; they probably are responsible the rumours of Mr. Matsudeira's retirement—now firmly discredited by the Foreign Office's strong testimonial. Supporters of a Feasoned policy of friendship with Japan are apt to be put out of their stride by the constant effort to endorse Japanese rigidity and to make the endorsement with an implied doubt of British sincerity. 'The ill-advised anxiety to restate the supposed merits of an Anglo-Japanese Alliance, coupled with a demand for a premature recognition of Manchoukuo, seems to come quaintly from political camps which affect' to decry defeatism jand assume, on other occasions, the monopoly of true-blue British patriotic fervour. Sir John Simon's Fecent emphasis on the need to keep polities and business apart has, it is credibly asserted, been strongly endorsed by at least one member of the Barnby Mission—and no wonder!
Thanks to the admirable diplomacy of Mr. Matsudaira and' to the wide knowledge of Mr. Hirota, there is no ground for the belief that British policy is misunderstood in the Foreign Office Tokyo. Yet the advocates of the adoption of some spectacular de-toute profess to discern in Japan mistrust of Great Britain and. a bewilderment over British diplomatic pronouncements. They argue that Japan feels isolated by some undefined errors of omission commission on Great Britain's part and that that feeling can be Temoved only by a formal all: ance ind recognition of Manchoukuo, in advance of whatever eventual action may be taken by the League, to which Great Britain, no. less than China, belongs. Sir John Simon has told the House of Commons exactly why those specifics cannot be adopted. His statement can have caused neither surprise nor resentment in Tokyo, where the schwarmerei of certain British critics who are "more royalist than the king" must sometimes evoke amused embarrassment, Whatever "may be'the view of these critics, it is clear that the {Tokyo Foreign Office understands jthe consistency of British policy, in support of the League, in adhering to the Washington Treaty and in endeavouring to maintain friendship both with America and Japan. Great Britain's association, with Japan and other Powers, in Mr. Ramsay MacDonald has notably cleared the air with the statement which is published day.
It confirms this journal's view that British friendship both with the United States of America and with Japan is being steadily maintained. Well-meaning efforts to force the pace of understanding with Japan "lack appreciation of the essential differences between the exponents of Japanese policy. JAn illustration comes from Jap-Janese comments on the Barnby visit Manchoukuo, [While some have endeavoured to show that that visit will result in material benefits to British trade (with the recognition of Manchoukuo dreamily floating jon the horizon), others have been pains to Feassure Japanese manufacture! on that point, On the reported arrangement of credit for the purchase of British railway equipment for Manchoukuo, the "Japan Advertiser" is disposed to argue that although "orders obtained by the Mission may be a Jdisturbing factor in the Manchou-/kuo trade situation" disturb-lance will be but temporary:
They carry no pledge on the part Manchoukuo that British dustries will receive additional orders. As they will substantiate the expected assertion in the mis ion's report that business available in the new State, British traders are likely. to intensity their efforts to make sales, but traders of other countries that can compete with them on prices and credit terms will not find them-
The commentator, with his eye sympathetically fixed on Japanese interests which cannot be expect-Jed to have spacious views on "open doors", then explains that these railway orders given Jabroad are useful in that they deal with a demand for rapid expansion of strategic railways and thus Jobviate the need for Japanese Plants to be developed to meet a spasmodic inquiry. Reduced to the simplest terms, this means that the British manufacturer is being asked merely to assist Japan to dispense with outside assistance as quickly as possible. When it is Jcommon knowledge that some divergence of view exists between the different Japanese authorities Manchoukuo and, again, between them and Tokyo, it surely is unwise to assume'that any particularly definite political action in ithe direction of Manchuria would be welcomed by those who, in the last resort, have to expound the official Japanese attitude to the British Government. So the observer is brought back sharply to /Sir John Simon's sage refusal to allow business and politics to be Tt may be left there in the hope that the Prime Minister's latest announcement will apply a much-needed corrective to those who are so gratuitously solicitous for the welfare of Anglo-Japanese friendship, that they disregard the broader issues of British policy generally in the Far East,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.