Sir Eric makes out a good case for British relations with Chine, and it cannot be denied, as that the British policy has always been to promote "a prosperous, united and independent China." In reier-ring to the difficulties which have arisen he mentions that the personal contacts between the British and the Nationalists were seldom—satisfactory; and on this point there is, of course, a good deal of room for argument. The Lea n whom he classifics as usually fburnalists or irwyers, have well-founded accusaons against the Chinese, and some of them especially those outside the categories named, can talk by the hour about the shortcomings of the Chinese. Nevertheless, the author correctly recognizes that foreign sympathy throughout the present crisis has been with the Chinese, and that relations between the British and the Chinese are now as close and intimate as ever before. It may be remarked that one reason for the closer intimacy is that the Chinese are being forced by conduct of the Japanese to recognize that the British are comparatively angelic from the human point of view. The author claims that the Chinese historian of the future may well write down Britain as China's best and oldest friend. Yet Britain, he admits, nas not in the past been popular in China; and Chinese of the educated Classes, many of whom have been trained in American colleges and schools, tend to be prejudiced against ihe British and their activities im China. History can only too be stuffed with evident imperialism in Asia. Chinese resentment, suspicion and hostility have in {he past been roused by British policy in Tibet and on the Burma-Yunnan frontier (directed, though the Chinese Would not believe it, solely to the protection of tne Indian Empire); and Cly the attitude of the British Government, before their change of heart in 1926, in seeking to uphold agains the rising wave of Chinese Nationalism ihe complicated fabric of British treaty rights and vested interests Moreover. ihe personal contacts between the British treaty port communities and the educated youth of China were seldom satisfactory. The ge Englishman of Shangh ports conveyed Chinese fellow ci ins an impression of aloof complacency, t ind an irritating assumption of racial superiority. Very likely he felt nothing of the kind, bu could not help the atmosphere h carried with him. Social intercourse footing of equality used scarcely Also responsible for much British unpopularity in China Was the old die-hard "China Hand. Usually a journalist or lawyer, with his interests rooted in the exterritorial regime, ad developed an anti-Chinese, treaty port complex and regarded all manifestations of the new Nationalist China with soured and jaundiced eye. In spite of the general chaos, civil war and spate of agitation, those responsible for the control of British policy in Chin. recognized in the fevered nationalism Of the Kuomintang a new leaven of Yegeneration for the decaying and disintegrating body politic of Eh Local British interests at the tre ports, too close to, and too much in-Yolved in, the maelstrom of events in China, failed altogether to grasp the true significance of what hi ing. The new policy was ini the face of a storm of local criticism caching at times the levels of vituporation: and it was continued in th face of much discourayemen many obstacles. Gradually the ese Came to recognize iis sincerity wider implications. From 1925 to° 192 China and Britain were often on the verge of war; from 1928 relations slarted to improve; within a year or two they were relatively good, and since then they have become as clos ate as they have ever been
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.