The introduction of the Essential Commodities Bill into the House of Commons is to, be taken as nothing more than prudent ion against emergencies and by no means justifies. the belief that such emergencies are any nearer now than they have been during the past few yea Indeed it may be safely hazarded that they are more distant now than they have been for a long time. Nevertheless the experiences of the last war clearly proved that one of the principal forms of preparedness is concerned with the adequate supplies foodstuffs, forage for animals, fertilizers and petroleum. It is clear that the Government is determined that the United Kingdom shall never again run the risks of blockade similar to those which the German submarines sə nearly completely established during the Great War. It is for that reason that the provisions of the Bill are described as precautionary rather than preventive, for it is clear that while stored supplies cannot prevent a blockade—only efficient naval action can do that—the storing of supplies against emergencies will serve to cover the time lag between any new development in the art of naval blockade and the devising of means wherewith to combat it. Thus it is not proposed to equip the British Isles with sufficient stores to withstand a seige, but rather to insist upon means of keeping the sea-lines open, always with the proviso that a situation might arise in which the existence of reserve supplies immediately available would be a sufficient iüsurance against any temporarily untoward development in certain phases of naval warfare. Sir Thomas Inskip has clearly stated the intention of the government when he said "We do not want stocks io withstand a seige, but to carry us over a period vf trade disturbance, interruption in shipping and the possible destruction of stocks at ports." It is, of course, difficult to estimate what length of time would be required to overcome the disadvantages arising out of any of the dislocations which he envisages, though it is suggested that the general policy provides (ample time for the restoration of the supplies of essential foodstuffs.
If there is any particular criticism to be levelled against the Government's essential foodstuffs programme as at present developed, it is to be found in the fact that the scheme contemplates the creation of a number of huge Stores where such goods might be preserved against the outbreak of trouble. The danger of such a practice is that the larger such warehouses and their districts, the larger the targets offered to a possible enemy, and where under the new concept of war it is desirable to strike inimediately at the civilian population behind the forces in the field or on the seas, the destruction of such stores, or the dislocation of the means of distribution might very reasonably be one of the first objectives of the enemy. It is inevitable, perhaps, that stich goods as those which the Government has already admitted purchasing should be more or less centrally stored, but there is a larger aspect of the question of food storage against emergency which does not appear to have received the attention it should. If it is admitted that wholesale centralization of foodstuff reserves present attractive targets 0 an enemy, then the doctrine which it seems pted is one of decentralization. That cannot be carried out in its entirety, but there is a large number of foodstuffs of a not immediately perishable nature which need be centrally stored, but spread throughout Thus, if legislation were passed storekeeper to maintain six months stocks qf such goods in hand at all times, each city, town, village and hamlet would be more or less protected against even he destruction of central supply warehouses or railway communication, It might be argued that such a process would be exceptionally costly, and require an enormous inspection machine, that many shopkeepers might be unable to finance such a governmental requirement. It should not be beyond the powers of the government to do so and while the cost might be large it is to be doubted whether it would be of any greater dimensions than a large number of the other precautionary measures which have already been put in hand or are contemplated.
With the establishment of such stores in practically every trading street in Great Britain, for that is what it would amount to, a supply of food, which in normal times would be consumed in six months, but which under a rationing system would: last considerably longer, would be in existence. It would be independent of the larger supplies already accumulated by the Government, and what is of the greater importance would be immediately available in the event of war and would delay the moment when a final call had to be made on the reserves which the Government has already accumulated. It would consequently give the fighting services all the greater margin of time in meeting the new developments which it may reasonably be expected any potential enemy will have up his sleeve. Thus in the Great War, the development of the German submarine blockade gave the British Government many an anxious moment until means of adequately dealing with it were devised. It is just that period against which the food süpplies of Great Britain need to be protected by the accumulation of sufficient stores. The proposer of the suggestion under review did not contend that this should replace the scheme already prepared by the government, but might set up as a' subsidiary means of carrying cut the general scheme, It has about it the attractive feature that such stores would not be so vulnerable as those stored in recognized centres—and it must be remembered that no part of the British Isles is really safe from the visitation of the average bomber, though the defence might have a great deal to say about it—while their availability might be one of the best offsets to any danger of panic which is one of the chief symptoms which an air-minded enemy would seek to induce in the nation it was attacking. In considering all such questions as these it must be remembered that the needs of the fighting services must naturally come first, and in the event of any successful dislocation of means of communication, those to be served first on resumption would naturally be the fighting arms. With the adoption of such a scheme as is here reviewed the civilian population could for a very comfortable length of time—certainly until the communications system was rehabilitated—be left to look after themselves without any great drag upon the government.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.