The letter appearing in yesterday's correspondence columns urging that Pope Pius XII should employ the church's most powe: ful weapon,—that of excommunication,—against the leaders of aggression raises all sorts of interesting questions. The corre: pondent in question does not appear to suggest that aggressor nations should be laid under an interdict, but that thos responsible for committing them to warfare should be placed under the heavy displeasure of the Roman Catholic Church. The passing of the sentence of excommunication upon individuals, for which there is Biblical authority, was eventually under the Popes extended to whole nations, so that precedent would suggest that the moderate step which the correspondent suggests could in the cireumstances be amply justified. In 908 Pope Gregory V placed an interdict upon France because of the contumacy of King Robert the Wise, in 1102 Gregory VII treated Ge! many the same way, England was placed under a similar ban by Innocent III in 1208, while Adrian IV disciplined even Rome itself by the same means in 1155. The ex communication of individuals is consequently a small thing as compared with the exclusion of whole nations from the services of the Holy Church, and on the face of it there appears to be no reason why His Holiness should not avail himself of this weapon in an attempt to avert the holocaust which a modern widespread war must necessarily bring about. Excommunication of the leaders indicated would relieve the masses of adhere ence to any oaths of loyalty sworn to them personally. The fact that the Roman Catholic Church had so emphatically condemned any breach of the world's peace would be brought home to those millions of the faithful who regard the prospect of war with fear, and loathing, and might have the effect of swinging away from the leaders so much of the present support which they receive that an enormous effect might be had upon the governments which they lead. It might in certain circumstances bring about a condition in which aggressor States would no longer be able to carry on a war, and might "in the ultimate result lead to their rulers' downfall.
But there are other dangers which the Pope would undoubtedly have seriously to consider. What would be the effect upon the Church itself? Might it not lead to a serious schism with mundane politics completely opposed to spiritual control? Th is the danger that certain leaders of the Church would take matters into their own hands, as did Cardinal Innitzer in Vienna, who, urging obedience to the German Government following the Australian anschluss last year, brought down very considerable criticism, and condemnation upon his head. There cannot be the slightest doubt that such an excommunication would put the whole authority of the Roman Catholic Church to a test from which it may very well wish to refrain, for should such a move fail tow obtain the desired results the Church would have received a reverse from which it could scarcely hope to recover. The answer to that might very well be that the Church faced with such gigantic issues must, for better or worse, take a definite stand. With that there will in all probability be general agreement, but, human nature being what the question of expediency must always play an important part in the history of mankind. There is still the further consideration that while what are called the aggressor States have undoubtedly committed great wrongs in the past, and may commit further in the future, those which claim to be non-aggressors have not completely clean hands. In a court of equity, such as the Pope would have to constitute himself in arriving at so momentous a decision, that fact would have to be taken into consideration, and, he, and his advisers might not find it quite so easy to arrive at a clear cut decision as to the ultimate justice of the whole matter which alone would enable him. to take the course suggested.
In this connection His Holiness's Easter and peace message read in St. Peter's following the Mass en Easter Sunday deserves to be recalled, and more particularly the following extracts The Pope criticized violations of treaties and pledged words, advocating respect for human dignity, liberty and a fair distribution of riches.
"There can be no peace," said His Holiness, "If mutual comprehension b: tween nations is lacking and pacts solemnly registered and pledged words lose all value which is the necessary basis for mutual confidence and without which material and moral disarmament becomes every day more difficult to realize.
Justice involves obedience to the legitimate authorities, that laws should aim at the general good and should be obeyed, and that liberty, human dignity and riches should be fairly distributed."
The Pope pointed out that today, "tension and excitement reigns everywhere in the world and nobody knows whether we are not on the eve of catastrophe." "How can international peace be preserved," he asked, "if in some countries there is no security at home and innumerable men are out of work, in contrast with governments with luxury for a few select classes."
"How can peace be maintained," he continued, "if between nations there is no goodwill?"
His Holiness declared, "that justi peace -are inseparable, order within countries, must be impossible." and that international peace The general balance of those passages suggest that he would be loath in the extreme to throw the weight of his authority either way in so grave a matter, at least until the issue was more clearly defined by action which it is still hoped to avert. The Pope might very well, following the outbreak of war, condemn those responsible for the actual breach of the peace, and even take some such action as was suggested by the correspondent yesterday, though in all probability the traditional neutrality of the Church will be maintained. That might in the long run be the wisest course for if the influence of the Church, exercised in such a drastic manner, failed of its objective the second state might very well be infinitely worse than the first, The President's Appeal While the world will await with some anxiety the result of President Roosevelt's personal appeal to Herr Hitler, and Signor Mussolini, there is already sufficient material available to justify the belief that this latest manœuvre in the interests of peace stands but a slender chance of success, The cool reception which the message has secured in both Germany and Italy supports that view. Mr. Roosevelt in effect suggests a reciprocal pledge between those two nations and 31 other couniries that for a period of ten years at the least, and 25 if possible none of them should infringe the others' borders, and if that is forthcoming he would seek to convoke world disarmament and economic conference in which the United States would participate, with the proviso, however, that it would not become a party to political agreements or discussions which might occur concurrently. The move was a praiseworthy one, and fully in keeping with the character of the man who made it As matters now stand, he, and only he can now take the initiative of personal appeals to the two Dictators, for the time is past when there can be any more trips to Berchtesgaden and Munich. That experiment failed, and the temper of European democracies is such that any statesman seeking: to repeat that unfortunate experiment would speedily find himself in disfavour with his supporters The message has been welcomed in most countries except Germany and Italy. It contains a suggestion which the 31 countries named can accept as being in accordance with what has been their policy all along, and there is practically no likelihood of any of them refusing it. On the other hand it may suit the books of neither Germany or italy. It has become increasingly clear during these last few months that the rulers of both those states have now to cash in on the sacrifices which they have imposed upon their people, and they could only accept such a proposition at a price which the democracies will in all probability not be prepared to pay. The declarations of both Herr Hitler, and Signor Mussolini that they are men of peace, may without undue cynicism be taken at their face value. Both of them do indeed desire peace, but not until they have made further territorial gains, after which a period of peace would be necessary to digest them. Mr. Roosevelt has put the fter quite clearly. The statements. of Mr.
Chamberlain and M. Daladier have long since removed any question of doubt from the issues involved. Point has been added to them by this latest appeal of the American President. and by their answer both Germany and Italy will be judged, not only by the people of the United States but by the whole of the world at large. From the point of view of the former this latest development is of the greatest importance. Berlin and Rome may decide cither to reject the appeal or ignore it. It does not matter much which they do, for in either event they would pin upon themselves further responsibility for whatever war may occur. and reinforce the very imposing support which is already being given to President Roosevelt's foreign policy in the United States. There is no exaggeration when the President says in his message on in the matter of the of political, economic, and social problems by peaceful methods and without recourse to arms. But the course of events seems to have brought back the threat of arms. If this threat is maintained it seems inevitable that a large part of the world will be engulfed in a common ruin. The whole world, the victorious nations, the vanquished nations and the neutral will suffer That probably both Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini perfectly well understand. What they appear to have in their minds is that if they can win—and the chances of that result are by no means as bright as they appear io think,—the amount of suffering they to endure will be comparatively small, and that recompense can be obtained from the vanquished nations. Fortunately, or unfortunately Germany has already shown how that need not necessarily be the case.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.