Reports from Peiping give some Inope of a satisfactory solution of recent difficulties. The plans tentatively suggested for the crea~ tion of a special administrative lcounell for Hopel and Charhar funder General "Sung Cheh-yuan are expected to receive the approval jot General Chiang Kal-shek, in his Inow capacity as President of the Executive Yuan. The Japanese military authorities on the spot have expressed their views on the subject. Until further develop ments arouse their vigilant anxiety, may be assumed that they. will not oppose the new scheme, although, to the outsider, it, may seem a little astonishing that this lconsigeration has to be so prom-Inently brought Into the picture lof a "purely Chinese movement." But then, as Sir Samuel Hoare told the House of Commons last week, the situation is "very obscure." The British and the United States Governments have been In consultation. The British representa tive at Tokyo has indicated that, Great Britain would welcome a frank statement of Japanese policy. That shows that the desire for! specific information on that subject is not confined to Nanking. - When the British Government is informed that "any Idea of Japan planning military Intervention Is entirely unfounded." it must find its despatches from Peiping and the reports of [Japanese military actions and words jin' the North extraordinarily. Interesting. Japanese aeroplanes have been again demonstrating over Peiping. General K. Dothara, in assiduously playing the rule of broadcast commentator on events— autonomous or otherwice—makes bones about mentioning the presence of Japan's military might learefully disposed on the other side lof the Great Wall. No-one would [suggest that the admirable diplomats jot the Japanese Foreign OMce, in response to so definite an enquiry from their British colleague, would 0 misinterpret the request for istrankness" as to indulge in airy evasions. Yet what Is the explana~ tion of the obvious discrepancy between their assertions and the hard facts of Japanese actions in the North?
Perhaps it were permissible to say that, gallantly preserving their optimism, the diplomats at Tokyo hope that, sooner or later, the con= sidered views of the civilians in {the Government will find recogni tion and that the Kwantung Army will abandon its pretensions control and initiation of policy. To the observer who has studied events: during the last four years, the hope [does credit to Tokyo's sense of responsibility, but hardly flatters its resp of realities. The familiar technique which has in erercendo key expounded the "special interests" of Japan in various perts lof China in terms of a progressive opacity, has acquired in the hands lot the Kwantung Army, a truly comprehensive scope. Tt creates pretexts for Japanese action with amazing facility, Nothing is. too hard for this technique to tackle—whether it be the need for proftecting China against Communist, whether it be the desire to tench Jeconomies to Dr. H. H. Kung, whether it be the duty of assisting the Chinese Government to determine the personnel of its administration. Significant is the admission of the local Chinese authorities {in Tientsin that the ben on the [Ta Kung Pao, now removed, was originally placed "under strong. fallen pressure." What was the Ta Kung Pao's offence? That journal whicn, incidentally has a great rep-lutation for sobriety and independlence, had deprecated any en-[couragement of separatist tendencies fin the North. In other words it Iliad championed the cause of [China's integrity—tor the preserve tion of which Japan has signed a solemn pact. Tt is not at all surprising that the British Foreign [Secretary should confess to. be-[wilderment as he compares Tokyo's statements with the course of events fin North China. From all this It must be assumed that the Japanese War Ofice, through its instrument, the Kwantung Army, is carrying lout in China a policy on which the Japanese Government has not been fable to. secure due ce-ordination between its military and civil departments, Tt must further be assumed, on the basis of facts as [they emerge relentlessly from the smoke-screen of verbiage, that Japan's policy in China is that which seems right In the eyes of General Doinaré
This view 1s reinforced by the apparent failure of successive attempts by Japanese diplomacy to establish stable relations with the Chinese Government, During the ast year it has been possible on no less than three occasions to dis cern an approach to _eomplete agreement between Mr, K. Hirota, working through Mr. Akira Ariyoshi, and the authorities at Nanking. On each occasion some mew flourish by the Kwantung Army or Japanese military spokesman has blocked a settlement and so preserved a sinister fluidity in those relationships. Sir Samuel Hoare last week made a pregnant refference to the danger to Jepanese Prestige which might arise from establishment of the belief that japanese influence was seeking to shape Chinese internal political developments and administrative arrangements." Tt seems Tokyo should seriously consider th position, 'The surrender of Japan' national conscience to military direction must gravely embarrass her relations with other powers. [Unless it be corrected it may event~ vally lead to an impasse, for It strikes at the very root of diplomatic conduct. Even more' important Is its moral effect, Despite the aparent success of military dictator= ships. the world Is still highly sensitive to any attack made on the Principles by which the funda= mental amity between nations and the sanctity of international obliga. tions. are cultivated and maintained.
treaty is insusceptible of amend= ment, but the whole fabric of civilization is endangered if the unilateral'repudiation of signed dace ments, especially. those of com= paratively recent origin, be ace counted a normal feature of national policy. Just now fifty nations are Teagued against one on that issue, That affords an object lesson to which Japan might usefully pay heed.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.