Feb. 12.
From two sources evidence comes lof the intensification of Italian effort to press the campaign in Ethiopia to further advance. Through the Suez Canal no less than 30,000 troops have passed from Europe within the fortnight ended Friday last. In Addis Ababa the admission is made that Makale has not been recaptured despite furious Ethiopian assaults. The defences are declared to have been exceedingly strong. This indicates that Marshal Badoglio has profited by his victory last month on the Adowa-Makale line in the Tembien salient to strengthen his grip on the Tigre province. He has apparently disposed for the moment of any danger of an [Ethiopian attack on his lines of com. munication between Adowa and Asmara. In the South, General Graziani's thrust which enabled him to advance from Dole to occupy /Negelli 240 miles from his starting point, has beef hailed as definitely restoring the situation to Italian, advantage. General Graziani is credited with having thus freed from Ethiopian rule a substantial tract of country which forty years ago accepted Italian sovereignly by 'a Convention concluded at Argasa Ascebo. His official reports have asserted that the local chiefs and notables have pledged themselves to ce-operate with the invaders against, the Government at Addis Ababa, Further significance attaches to the capture of Negelli in that it was the base from which Ras Desta, the Ethiopian leader in those parts, planned his drive into Italian Somaliland, an adventure which he carried almost to success. Now he has been deprived of important stores and munitions as the result of the Italians' occupation of his stronghold, He has, however, retired into the Sidamo foothills where, ac~ cording to advices from Addis Ababa last month, it was judged that the mechanized units' of the Italian forces would not be able easily to operate, Moreover, it is considered that from his setback advantage will accrue in the solution thus offered to the problem of victualling his undisciplined troops problem which had become Jacute. when he was threatening Italian territory and had probably contributed to the case of General Graziani's noteworthy advance, It is improbable that Marshal Badoglio will overlook the difficulties created by the lengthening of his lines of communication. It was by no means clear that General Graziani last month had been able to throw into Negelli sufficient troops to screen the permanent occupation of the country between that contre and Dole, it may be assumed that the reinforcements now being hurried from Europe will assist in the determination of that difficulty, although the maintenance of 240 miles of communication cane not be a light task to attempt, if the victorious cavalry at Negelli were not rapidly supported by the other arms of General Grazian!'s forces.
Even then his prospects are not necessarily encouraging for in the hilly country beyond he cannot expect to make much headway without careful reconnoitring and con~ siderable development of transport facilities. In the North the same problem presents itself to Marshal Badoglio, A brief message, recording the arrival at Dessie of an Irish doctor from the neighbourhood of Makale, revealed the fact that the Journey had taken 15 days—the distance as the crow fies being between 150 and 200 miles, In other words the Italian forces will have to rely on animal transport for their further invasion of Abyssinia before they can bring the full weight of their mechanized resources to bear upon their oppon~ ents. While they are grappling with that problem their exposure to guerrilla attacks from the Bthiopian tribes is likely to give them considerable anxiety. They have suf fered heavier casualties than in the carly stages of the campaign so Marshal Badoglio is experiencing the significance of his predecessor's much criticized caution, The Ethiopians have difieulties in maintaining the necessary cohe= sion which any army faced with the duty of stout resistance against an enemy of proved calibre must endeavour to command. The intrigues of the various chiefs were notorious in peace-time. They are not likely to have been magically dissipated by the presence of an enemy in the field. The Italians have of course made full uso of their own native forces to accent tuate this weakness, The Emperor's original plan was to restrain his troops from attacking in order to take full advantage of the dificult ties of the terrain. He has deliber~ ately endeavoured to remain on the defensive by withdrawing in the face of Italian advances with the object of giving his enemy longer ines of communication. The success of this policy is shown by the fact that the Italians were expected to be able to attack Harrar and Jijiga before Christmas. So far it would seem that those expectations have not been fulfilled. The possession of an unopposed air-force is an undoubted advantage to the invaders. It is weakened by the circumstance that targets are few, Bombing planes usually: expect to drop their bombs on. towns, or transport or roads or gun-emplacements or massed bodles of troops. A traveller thus pictures the position:
There are no towns except Horrar and Addis Ababa, There 1s no transport; the Abyssinian army
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.