Feb. 3.
The settlement of the Japanese Cabinet crisis, resulting from the success of General S. Hayashi in forming a ministry, is by no means contribution to' the permanent solution of the constitutional problem with which Japan has been faced for some time past. If anything it Js.likely to make matters worse, for the crisis has been solved entirely along lines "acceptable to the naval and military cliques, who succeeded in making it perfectly clear: from the outset that they would assist in making no Cabinet which would not give them that preponderance of -influence which they demand in the councils of the nation. Party government in Japan has sustained a severe reverse and the possibility that the major political parties will not ce-operate with the new Cabinet means very little one way or the other in view of the determination of the military and naval cliques to maintain' control of the government of the country. It is apparent from the atest trends that they are prepared fo govern the country with or without the: politicians and the result is that, despite the fact that the settlement: follows apparently constitutional lines, it is in truth almost a complete negation of all that constitutionality is held to mean in Japan: That country is rapidly passing into the control of a military and naval oligarchy which all civilian influence will inevitably be pushed into the background. It is true that the Navy is still inclined towards constitutional and somewhat liberal ideas, but that attitude would not long be maintained if it were—to find that its, demands were in any way ignored by a civilian Cabinet.
Japanese naval' and military leaders are busily. engaged in fashioning the fighting services into two Imposing weapons for, offence as well as defence. Their demands upon the revenue of the country during the past seven years have increased year by year until they needed for the 1935-36 period '¥en 1,022,700,000 as compared with' Yen 454,600,000 in the period 1931- 32. In addition to this the Army now insists upon the acceptance by General Hayashi's Cabinet of the Army's plan for—strengthening. national defence, including the new appropriations sought by it in the 1937-38 Budget and the six-year plan for the replenishment of armaments. The Navy's terms are not dissimilar. The more the facts, are studied the clearer it becomes: that the ordinary needs of a progressive nation are being neglected, in favour of the pursuit of policies calculated to bring that very war against which it is desired to prepare at such overwhelming cost to the nation. Nearly half of the' Japanese Budget for 1935-36 was} devoted (0 the Army and Navy and that despite the fact that the national debt has been increasing at! an alarming rate. It has been frequently remarked that the unfortunate economic situation in which Germany now finds herself is due to the huge sums she has been spending on rearmament. It has been apparent for some time that Japan's economic condition such as to give cause for grave anxiety, and this must continue to be the case so long as such vast sums as those which the Army and Navy demand have to be found.
It is not easy to suggest how cure can be effected. As matters stand "there can be no reform without a complete change in the attitude of the two cliques which now completely dominate the country, and that is not a thing which is at all probable. 'There has been a tendency of late to describe Japan as one of the totalitarian states, and to speak of it as being Fascist. 'That is hardly correct for the Army and' Navy have not wiped out opposition' but have! merely ignored and over-ridden it. It Is perltaps inevitable that professional soldiers and sailors should bbe infected with the war psychosis, which is so prevalent' throughout the world. In Japan the military dominance of the government has forced it to embark upon policies which increase the dangers of this universal state of mind. There is not the slightest doubt that the military policy with regard to Manchuria and China has brought about a situation in which Manchoukuo is by no means a profitable asset bul a very definite and heavy iability—for some time to come at} any rate. It is clear that the Army and Navy have not been governing the country in its own best inter ests, but for the purpose of realising, their own particular ambitions heedless of the cost to their unfor~ tunate nation. The new Cabinet will presumably have to decide} whether it will advise a dissolution of the Diet or proceed with the: existing legislature. The political parties are reported to have de~ clined to ce-operate in forming the Cabinet and, despite the power of the militarists in wrecking the! efforts of General Ugaki and in dictating General Hayashi's programme, the politicians still have an important weapon in their control of supplies, The Navy has opposed the dissolution the Diet and the holding of a general election, on the score that such a procedure would delay the voting of money which the Navy wants for the development of its) plans. The Navy very rightly takes the altitude that the result of the election would not matter; it would be immaterial what party returned to power, for it could not form a Cabinet without the consent of both the Army and the Navy, and that consent would always be withheld from a leader who did not agree to their terms. Yet, if the politicians persevere, their ac~ tivities in the Diet may easily pres~ ent" the new Cabinet with an awkward problem and bring into} sharper conflict the opposing views. of the militarists and constitution alists.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.